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THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD
FOREWORD: LAW AS EQUILIBRIUM
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey*
With the confirmation of Justice Stephen Breyer to the United
States Supreme Court, the legal process school has quietly attained
what every Supreme Court litigator seeks: a majority on the Court.
Along with Justice Breyer, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Gins-
burg are all alumni of Henry Hart's and Albert Sacks's Harvard Law
School courses on "The Legal Process." As such, they have been
schooled in legal process's emphasis on the creation of law by interact-
ing institutions, the purposiveness of law and these institutions, and
the mediating role of procedure. Perhaps it should not be surprising,
then, that the Supreme Court's I993 Term was replete with these
themes, even before Justice Breyer clinched a numerical majority for
Hart and Sacks.
The appearance of legal process graduates on the Court comes at
an appropriate time. The 199os is a decade of downscaling in Ameri-
can public law. The constitutional activism characteristic of the War-
ren Court, and perpetuated to a surprising degree by the Burger
Court,' has given way to the Rehnquist Court's comparative reluc-
tance to expand, or in some cases even to protect, established constitu-
tional rights of individuals. It has been up to Congress to fill the gaps,
partially, with rights-creating or -expanding statutes.2 With the de-
cline in the Court's constitutional activism has come a corresponding
paucity of discourse about values in the federal courts. The Warren
Court contributed to an intensified normative conversation in law that
the more cautious Burger Court continued. At the same time that is-
sues of privacy, gender and racial equality, sexual and religious free-
dom, and the environment continue to generate fierce debate in the
* William N. Eskridge, Jr. is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and
Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School. Philip P. Frickey is Faegre & Benson Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota School of Law.
An earlier draft of this Foreword was presented to faculty workshops at the Ohio State
University School of Law, the Georgetown University Law Center, and the University of Miami
School of Law. We received many useful comments at each session. We are particularly indebted
to Michael Les Benedict, James Brudney, Linda Cohen, Mary Coombs, Daniel Farber, Robert
Katzmann, Kevin McGuire, Richard Posner, Matthew Spitzer, Michael Solimine, Lynn Stout,
Mark Tushnet, and Steven Winter for their individual criticisms and suggestions. David Burton
and Elizabeth Wyatt (both Class of 1996, Georgetown University Law Center) provided helpful
research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Foreword to THE BURGER CouRT: THE COUNTER-REvOLUTION
THAT WASN'T at vii, vii (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
2 See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of r993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1o7 Stat.
1488 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb) (expanding free exercise protections beyond those
afforded in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (199O)).
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halls of Congress, the playing field for these issues in the courts is now
usually statutory rather than constitutional interpretation.3 Ironically,
the Rehnquist Court's passivity in constitutional cases has been partly
offset by a greater activism in statutory interpretation cases. Never-
theless, the shift to statutory interpretation appears to have lowered
the stakes of court debates and limited the role of lawyers as litigators
and jurists.
At the same time, legal process theorizing about public law has
enjoyed a renaissance. 4 Legal commentary in the 199os has shown di-
minished interest in value-laden republican or natural law theories and
greater interest in pragmatic theories of public law.5 More impor-
tantly, for our purposes, commentators are open to theories that ex-
plore the institutional context of public law's evolution. In this
Foreword, we draw upon positive political theories of institutional in-
teraction to engage in what some readers may consider a scandalous
thought experiment. Positive political theory claims that lawmaking
institutions are rational, self-interested, interdependent, and affected by
the sequence of institutional interaction. When viewed through this
lens, law is not simply a formality of deductive analogical reasoning,
nor a battle over policy in which traditional conceptions of legal rea-
soning operate only as a facade for the direct exercise of raw power.
Instead, law is an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing
forces or institutions. Congress, the executive, and the courts engage
in purposive behavior. Each branch seeks to promote its vision of the
public interest, but only as that vision can be achieved within a com-
plex, interactive setting in which each organ of government is both
3 Discussion of statutory interpretation has become correspondingly more prominent in the
academic literature. See, e.g., Symposium, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary
Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1754, 755 (993) [hereinafter Symposium, Speluncean Ex-
plorers]; Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV.
529, 530 (1992) [hereinafter Symposium, Canons]; see also Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Tech-
nique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEo.
WASH. L. RaV. x, 4-5 (993) (noting the explosion in academic literature on statutory interpreta-
tion). Statutory interpretation has also received attention in the popular press. For example, sev-
eral stories about the nomination of Justice Breyer discussed his approach to statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., James H. Andrews, Breyer Would Join Court's Swing Center, CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR (Boston), July 18, 1994, at 6; Linda Greenhouse, Portrait of a Pragmatist: Confir-
mation Hearing for Breyer Elicits His Emphasis on Rulings' Lasting Effects, N.Y. TIES, July
14, 1994, at Ai, D22.
4 Witness the publication this year of the 1958 "tentative edition" of HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SAcKs, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994), and the revived interest those
materials have received from legal academics, especially in the i98os. See id. at cxxv-cxxvi.
5 Compare Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988) (discuss-
ing, at length, the implications of a "revival" of civic republicanism) with DENNIS PATTERSON,
LAW AND TRUTH (forthcoming 1995) and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE 456 (I990) (arguing that law cannot "accurately or usefully be described as a set of con-
cepts, whether of positive law or of natural law").
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cooperating with and competing with the other organs. To achieve its
goals, each branch also acts strategically, calibrating its actions in an-
ticipation of how other institutions would respond. We doubt that
many readers will question our assumptions of institutional rationality
and interdependence with respect to Congress, the President, and ad-
ministrative agencies. To some lawyers, however, the notion that the
Supreme Court engages in strategic behavior may be shocking.
Be that as it may, we believe that any sophisticated vision of mod-
ern public law requires an analysis such as ours. If one rejects the
formalistic notion that, for judges, law is a closed system of objectively
discoverable rules, one should be able to imagine a Court acting stra-
tegically in some circumstances. It may be difficult to demonstrate
such behavior in any given case, but generating hypotheses and testing
them against known information may reveal a basis for inferring the
existence of such behavior.
The 1993 Term of the Court is the field against which we will
develop our thesis and its ramifications. The main positive conse-
quence of our thesis (developed in Part II) is that law's equilibrium
will be a dynamic one. At any given time, most legal issues are in a
state of stable equilibrium; even if temporarily displaced, the institu-
tions move back toward the stable position.6 The most interesting
public law issues, however, tend to be those in which technological,
social, or economic changes have rendered an equilibrium unstable, or
at least susceptible to movement. At that point, one of the institutions
of government, often the Court, will in fact successfully shift public
policy to render it more reflective of its own preferences. As a matter
of doctrine, we conclude, the Court will interpret statutes to reflect
legislative deals in the short-term and new political balances over time.
In both instances, the Court will usually defer to agencies as the most
reliable barometers of political equilibria (if there be any). The
Court's constitutional interpretation is equally dynamic, transparently
accommodating apparent national equilibria. For national policies, the
Court has displaced most constitutional activism to the quasi-constitu-
tional realm of statutory clear statement rules, but the Court remains
activist in reviewing state and local measures.
In short, the 1993 Term's decisions cannot persuasively be under-
stood as mere applications of rule-of-law methods in which the Court
neutrally or objectively applies authoritative text or precedent to new
issues. Nor are the decisions completely explicable as the Court's sim-
6 Stable equilibrium is the common law ideal, best exemplified at the Supreme Court level in
admiralty cases. Even when the Court creates new admiralty rules, it is careful to demonstrate
the consistency of the new rules with other developments in law and society. See, e.g., Boca
Grande Club, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., II4 S. Ct. 1472, 1472 (1994) (Stevens, J.); Mc-
Dermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 14 S. Ct. 1461, 1464-65 (1994) (Stevens, J.); Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970) (Harlan, J.).
1994]
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pie application of its own conservative values. Rather, we maintain
that the decisions are only comprehensible if viewed as a complex
amalgam of rule-of-law and substantive values applied selectively by a
strategic Court.
It is in the Court's self-interest to behave strategically, and the
Court does so, constantly. Is such a Court normatively attractive?
Supplementing the positive vision developed in Part H with sugges-
tions from normative political theory, we develop the tentative outline
of a complex prescriptive framework in Part H. On the one hand,
viewing law as equilibrium offers a way to reconcile theoretical ten-
sions between democratic values and the rule of law. On the other
hand, a Court that exploits policymaking opportunities too often or
that never confronts a flawed national consensus is disserving both de-
mocracy and the rule of law.
I. LAW AS EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
Oliver Wendell Holmes viewed law as prediction, usually predic-
tion of what the courts would say the common law is.7 In the modern
administrative state, in which statutes have largely displaced the com-
mon law and agencies are the main interpreters of statutory law,
Holmes's idea might be expressed in a more complicated way: law is a
prediction of the rules that interacting government institutions will ap-
ply. The interaction is typically sequential. Congress enacts statutes
acceptable to the President, agencies implement them through regula-
tions and enforcement proceedings, the judiciary interprets the statutes
and agency actions, and Congress considers amending the statute to
update it or to override errant interpretations. A consequence of se-
quence is that each institution has trumping power. The rule adopted
by each institution can be undone by the next institution to act. Con-
gress is the only institution that can enact statutes, subject to the Pres-
ident's veto power,8 and agencies can implement the statute in a
variety of ways that thwart or expand upon the original legislative
design.9 The Supreme Court can overturn a Congress-President con-
sensus through statutory or constitutional interpretation.10 The
Court's action, in turn, is subject to the possibility of an override by
7 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, Yo HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (897).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
9 Execution of the "laws" adopted by Congress is regulated by Article II of the Constitution,
which places no clear formal constraint on executive agencies. Independent agencies are not
clearly regulated at all by the Constitution, and there is nothing in the Court's precedents that
requires these agencies to be simple agents of Congress.
10 Article III of the Constitution imposes no clear formal constraints on the Court's exercise of
the "judicial Power" to interpret statutes to resolve cases. The Federalist No. 78 contemplated
that the judiciary would give narrowing interpretations to "unjust and partial laws" and would
invalidate laws inconsistent with the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., i96i).
[VOL. 108:26
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Congress acting with the President (for statutory and some constitu-
tional cases) or by a constitutional amendment. Given this potential
for sequential trumping, a modern lawyer whose client needs to know
what the law "is" has a far more complicated predictive task than that
described by Holmes.
The operation of this sequential structure is illustrated by the
evolution of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," which was
originally aimed at prohibiting intentional race discrimination in the
workplace. A liberal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) early on gave the statute a broader reading, to prohibit em-
ployment practices that have an unintended but disparate impact upon
racial minorities. 12 A moderately liberal Supreme Court accepted the
EEOC's interpretation in 197 i, 13 and for eighteen years there was a
stable institutional equilibrium as to disparate impact liability. A dif-
ferently constituted Court displaced that equilibrium in i989,14 but
Congress overrode the Court and reinstated the prior equilibrium
through the Civil Rights Act of i9i. s A Holmesian in 1964 could
not have anticipated the developments in the 199os, or even in the
197os. A Holmesian in 199o, however, could have predicted that the
law would move back toward the earlier EEOC view,16 but such a
prediction would have had to be based upon an evaluation of Court-
Congress-President dynamics and not upon expectations about what
any single institution - such as the common law courts on which
Holmes focused - was going to do.
Reaching beyond Holmes's position that law is simply prediction,
legal process thinkers maintained that law is purposive, serving the
social and economic needs of citizens.' 7 For these thinkers, prediction
cannot be completely separated from prescription. What one thinks
law "is" cannot be segregated from what one thinks law "ought to be"
to achieve its purposes. Similarly, institutional interaction is pur-
posive: each institution not only contributes to the general purposes of
state activity or the law in question, but also contributes in a way
appropriate to its own functions and competence within the system.
The history of Title VII reveals that all the relevant actors sought to
11 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2oooe to 2000e-I7 (I988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
12 See HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 244-50 (199O).
13 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (ig7i).
14 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-61 (1989) (imposing new burdens
of proof on Griggs plaintiffs).
Is Pub. L. No. 102-166, io5 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.,
29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
16 This was indeed the prediction made in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?
Playing the Court/CongresslPresident Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 661-62 (1991).
17 See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 8-o (194o); HART & SACKS, supra
note 4, at 6-9, 102-05, 148.
19941
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implement the general principle of racial equality, but approached the
task from different institutional perspectives. Congress established the
legal rights and obligations outlined by the statute, but did so at a
high level of abstraction. Application of the law to specific fact situa-
tions and unforeseen problems was the province of the EEOC and the
courts. These implementing bodies applied the law in light of their
understandings of its purposes. In turn, a later Congress was available
to override applications or interpretations that did not meet its concep-
tion of the statute's proper goals and effects.
Law is not simply a prediction that preexists the sequential, hierar-
chical, and purposive interaction of institutions. It is, instead, a pro-
duct of that interaction - an equilibrium, that is, a balance of
competing institutional pressures. It is a stable equilibrium when no
implementing institution is able to interpose a new view without being
overridden by another institution.
For example, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,18 a closely di-
vided Supreme Court held that Title VII, which precluded money
damages, was the exclusive federal remedy for claims of racial dis-
crimination in the workplace. This was law in the positivist sense -
an authoritative statement by the institution that declares the law -
but not in a deeper legal process sense, for the decision was contrary
to a consensus among other institutions favoring monetary remedies
for racial discrimination in the workplace. 19 The Civil Rights Act of
199
I
20 overrode the Patterson decision but raised a new uncertainty.
Although the relevant institutions were in a stable equilibrium as to
the general issue of workplace discrimination remedies after I99I, they
were not in stable equilibrium as to a specific issue: Did the i99i Act
apply retroactively? Congress had sent mixed signals. The EEOC
and most lower courts held that the statute's provision of remedies
was not retroactive, and the Supreme Court this Term upheld that
position in Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.21 Unlike the Court's deci-
sion in Patterson, which temporarily displaced a stable equilibrium,
the Court's decision in Rivers created a stable equilibrium. Neither
the President nor Congress was willing to place race-based job dis-
crimination back on the political agenda after the exhausting effort
that yielded the 1991 Act.
18 491 U.S. 164, 178-8o (1989) (rejecting an application of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) to racial
discrimination arising from the conditions of a person's employment).
19 See Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United
States House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at iS-i6, Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-io7); Brief of Forty-Seven States, the District
of Columbia, and Three Territories as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13-15, 23-24,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (z989) (No. 87-107).
20 See Civil Rights Act of ggi , Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 2o, io5 Stat. 1071, 1071-72; H.R.
REP. No. 40 (I), 1o2d Cong., ist Sess. 92-93 (iggi), reprinted in 2992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 63o-31.
21 See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1519-20 (1994).
[Vol. 108:26
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Although the legal process philosophy suggests that law is equilib-
rium, positive political theories allow us to develop more systemati-
cally the legal process approach to institutions.22 Such theories start
with the axioms that institutions are rational in taking actions that
serve their preferences or goals, and that, in pursuing such goals, insti-
tutional actors act in light of the knowledge that they are interdepen-
dent. This interdependence suggests that institutions will behave
strategically, anticipating the responses of other institutions and signal-
ling the nature and intensity of their preferences to the other institu-
tions. We explain these hypotheses below and, in Part II, apply them
to analyze the Court's decisions in the 1993 Term.
A. Institutional Rationality and Interdependence
To say that an institution behaves "rationally" is to say that the
institution makes choices that plausibly advance its goals. American
jurisprudence has traditionally insisted that public institutions, espe-
cially the Supreme Court, behave rationally in this sense. What has
divided competing jurisprudences is their different conceptions of the
Court's characteristic or permissible goals.
The turn-of-the-century formalists and their current heirs maintain
that the Court has a single goal: declaring and enforcing the rule of
law. Whereas Congress makes the law and the President and agencies
execute the law, the Court declares the law by drawing upon preexist-
ing authorities - the Constitution, statutes, and precedents - and
makes the law coherent by reconciling authorities over time.2 3 This
goal can be expressed in political theory terms as imparting a sense of
continuity, stability, and reliability to the law's obligations.
Holmes implied and the legal realists believed that the Court is
rational in a different sense: it seeks to import its own substantive
preferences into law and policy.24 While formalists maintain a sharp
22 For introductions to "rational choice" or "positive political" theories of the institutional
political process, see JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT at vi,
vii, 3-9 (1962); WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSrrIvE
POLITICAL THEORY 1-7 (1973); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO.
LJ. 457, 458 (1992). Earlier political science works exploring the role of the Supreme Court
within an interdependent political system include WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY 26-28 (x964) and C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT,
1957-1960, at 128-33 (i96I). See also ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE
SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED 152-87 (1986) (describing the role of the
Court as part of the institutional evolution of transportation policy).
23 On the classical formalists, see Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. I
(1983). For recent exemplars of formalist inquiry, see Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1140, 1144 (1994); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1175, 1184 (1989); and Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality
of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950-53 (1988).
24 When we speak of an institutional preference, we are usually referring to the preference of
a controlling group of people within the institution or, at times, to the preference of the institu-
tion's "median" member.
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distinction between legislative and judicial rationality, realists see the
goals of both institutions in instrumentalist terms. Like the President
and Congress, the Court reads the Constitution, statutes, and common
law precedents in light of its own specific policy preferences or its gen-
eral network of beliefs and attitudes. 25 Pressing the realist attitude,
most political scientists tend to view judicial lawmaking as simply dis-
tributing power and benefits to groups and interests favored by the
Court.
2 6
In addition to the formalist and realist conceptions of institutional
rationality is the legal process conception:27 the Court's goal is to pre-
serve the integrity of its institutional character, as well as its special
position in American society. Courts are special because they are neu-
tral bodies that adjudicate disputes. When the Court makes decisions
about public law, it should be careful neither to sacrifice its adjudica-
tive integrity, nor to undermine its legitimacy in American govern-
ment. Within these confines, the Court should contribute to
lawmaking by using its comparatively greater ability to engage in the
reasoned elaboration of principle.
There is good sense in each of these three ways of understanding
the Supreme Court's goals, as illustrated by the decision in Patterson.
The written opinion presents its holding as faithful to stare decisis and
mandated by a clear statutory text.28 Some commentators are unim-
pressed with the formal coherence of the decision and view it as the
Court's expression of its substantive dissatisfaction with the multipli-
cation of often expensive remedies for discriminatory acts.2 9 Finally,
the decision can be viewed as resulting from the Court's hesitation to
extend its own precedents in a way that might affront a coordinate
branch because such a reading would "undermine the detailed and
well-crafted procedures for conciliation and resolution of Title VII
claims" set up by Congress and administered by the EEOC.30 None of
these ways of reading Patterson is greatly superior to the other two;
the decision reflects a combination of rule-of-law (formalist), substan-
tive policy (realist), and institutional competence (legal process) goals
25 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 102-o6 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn,
The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (934).
26 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE 311-12 (1992); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 37-41 (1965); JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993).
27 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962); Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 365-72 (1978); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (959).
28 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 64, 172-75, 176-82 (1989).
29 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ch. 8 (1994); see
also Mark V. Tushnet, Patterson and the Politics of the Judicial Process, 1988 SuP. CT. REV. 43,
57-59 (arguing that the Court's willingness to raise, sua sponte, the issue of overruling precedent
was inspired by the Justices's views about civil rights).
30 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 18o.
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of the majority of Justices. Just as a cable with three interwoven
threads is stronger than a single-threaded string, so a decision sup-
ported by three different institutional purposes is stronger than a deci-
sion supported by a single one. 3 1
Similarly, under our understanding of law as equilibrium, law that
is a balance among three interacting branches is superior to law as it
might be produced by a single institution. The law that results from
the input of executive or independent agencies and courts should be a
better informed, more widely acceptable law than that fresh out of the
legislature.32 Three heads might be better than one, especially if, as
legal process theory posits, each head brings a special expertise and
satisfies different requirements the citizenry expects from its govern-
ment. Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might be a better law if
Congress, the President or the EEOC, and the Court interact by ra-
tionally pursuing their different institutional goals. One advantage of
law as institutional equilibrium is that it renders law more adaptable
over time because groups objecting to outdated legal rules have multi-
ple fora in which to press their petitions for change. Additionally, this
feature of law might yield more broadly acceptable rules because their
evolution will reflect inputs from various institutions.3
3
A challenge suggested by the equilibrium nature of law is that the
institutions might operate at inefficient cross-purposes, generating un-
stable or inconsistent rules. Because each institution potentially has
different constituencies to satisfy, the institutions may be drawn into a
spiral of perpetual mutual trumping, as each tries to achieve its dis-
tinctive goals.3 4 This risk is mitigated by a further feature of law as
31 The cable-string metaphor is inspired by the cable-chain metaphor in 5 CHARLES S.
PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS 264 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 196o).
32 This was contemplated by THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., ig6x). See also DAvD F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST
189-9o (1984) (arguing that a judiciary can beneficially influence law-making through its interpre-
tation of the statutory and constitutional law).
33 Cf Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Inno-
vation, 22 WAM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 672-80 (ig8i) (arguing that the redundancy of having many
possible judicial fora embodied within the federal system of concurrent jurisdiction results in a
fairer and more innovative judicial system). The institutions - Congress, the President or the
EEOC, and the Court - are likely to be heterogeneous in their approaches, because their person-
nel are put in office at different times and serve different terms of office under different rules of
maximum service, and because the institutions are accountable to different constituencies, operate
from different norms and traditions, and have different staff services.
34 The challenge is related to the phenomenon of majority "cycling," in which choice among
three alternatives by players with complex preferences will not yield a single inevitable choice.
See WILLLM H. RIKER, LIBERALiSM AGAINST POPULISM 119-23 (1982). However, procedures
and institutional structures ameliorate cycling in the political process. See DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRCICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 49-55 (iggi); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R.
Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 5 11-14
(198i).
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equilibrium: the interacting institutions act with an awareness of their
interdependence.
35
B. Institutions and Anticipated Response
Interdependent decisionmakers cannot achieve their rational goals
simply by choosing the course of action that directly satisfies those
goals. Instead, decisionmakers will behave strategically, choosing the
course of action that best achieves their goals in light of how they
anticipate other decisionmakers will respond to their own possible
choices. For example, an astute taxpayer desiring to minimize her tax
liability will likely not claim all of her personal expenses as tax deduc-
tions, at least in part because she anticipates that the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) would not only disallow many of the deductions, but
might impose heavy penalties upon her. The tax-avoiding taxpayer
will consider in her calculation how she thinks the IRS would respond
to her different possible deductions; she might take a few borderline
deductions, but not the ones the IRS rejects in its regulations, nor the
ones that she thinks would trigger a full-fledged audit.
Government institutions can be expected to engage in similar antic-
ipated response calculations. In deciding whether it will disallow our
taxpayer's deductions, the IRS will consider whether its preferred ac-
tion - squeezing more money out of the taxpayer - would likely be
appealed and, if so, sustained in the Tax Court. The Tax Court, in
turn, will evaluate the IRS's position not only in light of the Tax
Court's preferences, but also in light of whether its decision would be
reversed by the Court of Appeals, which will in turn be informed by
its appraisal of the prospect of being reversed by the Supreme Court.
Understanding this sequence and knowing a great deal about the pref-
erences of the other institutions (the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court, and Congress, which can override the agency and
the courts), the IRS will rationally choose the tax deduction policy that
best meets its goals without risking an override by the institutions that
may subsequently respond. The IRS might speculate as follows: we
want to deny deduction "x" but will not do so if we know the Tax
Court would reverse our decision; the Tax Court will not reverse us if
it thinks the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court will ultimately
agree with us; hence the key issue is whether the Supreme Court (or
Congress) will disagree with the IRS's view. Thinking backward like
35 Hart and Sacks argued that human beings are by nature social and interdependent, and
that our interdependence gives rise to our need for government as a coordinating mechanism. See
HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 2, 1o5. We flip their argument: the existence of state organs
imposes interdependence upon both private and public institutions.
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this, the IRS will roughly anticipate the equilibrium point and, if well-
informed, will choose that point as its own policy.36
Although we believe that the Supreme Court is not as often influ-
enced by the anticipated response feature of institutional decisionmak-
ing as are agencies and lower courts, there is a growing body of
empirical evidence indicating that the Court bends its decisions to
avoid overrides or other political discipline.37 As we now explain,
such behavior is rational, whether the Supreme Court's preferences are
dominated by rule-of-law, instrumental, or institutional concerns.
Thus, where the substantive preferences of key Justices dominate
their rule-of-law preferences (even if unconsciously), the Court - like
our taxpayer and the IRS - is likely to calibrate its response to avoid
an override that would set back its substantive agenda. Consider our
theory as a way of thinking about Planned Parenthood v. Casey.38
The Joint Opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter created
a legal regime allowing substantial state regulation of abortion even as
it reaffirmed Roe v. Wade.39 At least two of the three Justices had
expressed doubts about Roe's reasoning and its broad pre-emption of
state abortion laws.40 Their best course of action, however, was to
reaffirm Roe while curtailing its ambit. The Justices were aware that
an explicit overruling of Roe would have stimulated a firestorm of
protest against the Court and would probably have prodded Congress
to enact the proposed Freedom of Choice Act,41 which would have
pre-empted more state regulation. By preserving but narrowing Roe,
the three Justices in Casey achieved a variety of goals: states could
regulate abortion within certain parameters, the freedom of choice bill
was effectively derailed, and the Court as an institution avoided dam-
36 See John A. Ferejohn & Charles R. Shipan, Congressional Influence on Administrative
Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393, 397-99
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989) (discussing the constraints legisla-
tures as well as individual committees place on agencies' policy position choices).
37 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
ioi YALE L.J. 331, 390-403 (igi); see also Jeffrey A. Segal, Courts, Executives, and Legislatures,
in AMERiCAN COURTS 373, 388-89 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., iggi) (discussing a
study showing increased deference following executive attempts to curb the Court's power but
leaving open the question of whether this increased support resulted from changes within the
sitting Court's own views or from changes in the Court's composition brought about by the ap-
pointment process).
38 r12 S. CL 2791 (1992).
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518-2o (x989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
for a plurality, including Kennedy, J.) (rejecting Roe's trimester framework and applying an un-
specified level of scrutiny); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-59
(983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing a willingness to reconsider Roe).
41 S. 25, I02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 25, Io2d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see S. REP. No.
321, 1o2d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (iggi); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits,
79 VA. L. REv. I, 46-52 (I993).
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aging attacks upon it.42 Indeed, the Court may have emerged with an
enhanced reputation for neutrality, as it appeared that the Justices in
the Joint Opinion were rising above their personal preferences to reaf-
firm the rule of law embodied in Roe.
The Court's avoidance of overrides may also be animated by its
concern for its institutional position. This is a lesson of the Civil
Rights Act of i99i, which was triggered by five decisions in the 1988
Term.43 Although narrow Court majorities viewed the decisions as re-
flecting rule-of-law values, the cogency of that view was undermined
by the perception that the Court was redistributing legal entitlements
to disadvantage African-American employees like Brenda Patterson,
the loser in one of the cases. 44 In Congress's view, all five decisions
were uncooperative interpretations of statutes enacted to prohibit job
discrimination. The Court's legitimacy was shaken, but not irrepara-
bly, and the Court has been careful since i99i to avoid the impression
that its civil rights decisions are anti-minority. Casey can be similarly
viewed as the effort by centrist Justices to position the Court as neu-
trally as possible on the issue of abortion. These centrist Justices ra-
tionally understood that a position rejected by big majorities in
Congress and by the public would not be regarded as legitimate.
45
42 The Joint Opinion acknowledged the "sustained and widespread debate Roe has provoked,"
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812, and concluded that the Court's image as a legitimate institution would
be imperiled by overruling Roe. See id. at 2814-z6. The Joint Opinion contrasted the overrulings
of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (i9o5) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (2896) as
legitimacy-enhancing for the Court, essentially because those precedents had been overtakern by
new understandings about American society. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812-z6. The overrulings
of those precedents reflected power realignments in American society; the rise of labor unions
doomed Lochner and increased legal and political participation by African-Americans doomed
Plessy.
43 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. z64 (ig8g); Lorance v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, Inc., 490 U.S. 90o (ig8g); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (i989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (ig8g); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The 2991 Act
also overrode decisions from the iggo Term, see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1992); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (ig9i), and from the 1985 Term, see
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 3io (1986).
44 See, e.g., Roy L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 1 (1990) (com-
menting that the Rehnquist Court's civil rights decisions cast doubt on the Justices' belief in the
persistence of "a race problem").
45 Many commentators have asserted that Supreme Court decisions often reflect public opin-
ion. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 97 (1989);
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as Countermajoritarian Institution?
The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 87, 90-91
(993) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions taken as a whole usually reflect liberal-conservative
swings in public opinion, and that the 1988 Term, when Patterson and the other anti-minority
interpretations of Title VII were handed down, was the most exceptional divergence). But see
Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 Am. POL.
SC. REV. 711, 711, 716 (1994) (rejecting the claim that public opinion has a direct effect on the
Court and arguing "[w]hatever influence public opinion exercises ...occurs indirectly, through
the choice of justices by presidents chosen by the people").
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Finally, Casey illustrates how the Court's rule-of-law values might
themselves augur in favor of its considering legislative reactions. It is
far from clear what the rule of law required in Casey. Does the Due
Process Clause's protection of "liberty" include a woman's "liberty" to
control her body? Has Roe v. Wade been so undermined by subse-
quent decisions that it carries no force as precedent? There are honest
differences of opinion as to what the rule of law required in Casey. If
the current Congress has a clear view as to what "liberty" means
under the Due Process Clause or under a statutory analogue, that un-
derstanding may be relevant to the rule-of-law meaning of that provi-
sion - especially if one interprets the rule of law to be a rule of
authoritative textual commands.4 6
C. Institutional Signalling and Implicit Bargains
Overrides are hardly the only means by which interdependent law-
making institutions communicate with one another. 47 Lawmaking in-
stitutions routinely send "signals" to one another48 - expressions of
preference that have no traditionally understood legal "authority."
Nonetheless, a signal may have legal consequences, and these conse-
quences may have been precisely the reason for the signal. For exam-
ple, "dictum" in a Supreme Court opinion is not law in a formal sense
and has no binding stare decisis value. 49 Yet what the Court says in
its opinions, whether it is essential to the holding or not, is often
treated as "law" by other legal actors, especially lower courts. Com-
mittee reports generated in Congress and messages and statements
generated in the White House are likewise signals sent to the other
institutions and are often treated as evidence of legal equilibria by
agencies, courts, and private parties.
46 Professional linguists consider conventionally accepted word usage in determining what lan-
guage means and whether a text is ambiguous. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES 6-17, 94-95 (I993); Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey
P. Kaplan, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, io3 YALE L.J. 1561, 1568-69 (x994).
47 Institutions also communicate directly. The President talks to Congress through speeches,
messages, or lobbying; congressional leaders regularly report to the President, and all congres-
sional members gripe to agencies; both Congress and the President communicate to the Court
through arguments and briefs in cases involving their interests, and sometimes through a personal
appearance before the Court. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. CL 1719, x722 (994) (deciding
9-0 against Sen. Specter, who came before the Court both as plaintiff and lawyer).
48 On signalling games of the type we are describing, see JEFFREY S. BANKS, SIGNALING
GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 3-6 (i99i); William B.T. Mock, Game Theory, Signalling, and
International Legal Relations, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 33, 35-40 (1992); Edward P.
Schwartz, Pablo T. Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 5x, 55-59, 71-74 (Winter 1994) (special issue).
49 For instance, in some cases in the 1993 Term, the Court declined to follow dicta. See Heck
v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2369-70 (1994) (Scalia, J.); Department of Taxation & Fin. v.
Milhelm Attea & Bros., 114 S. CL 2028, 2034 (x994) (Stevens, J.); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 114 S. Ct. x673, 1676 (i994) (Scalia, J.).
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Signals contribute to the efficient operation of an institutional sys-
tem. Like bids in a game of bridge, signals are a relatively cheap way
for cooperating institutions to exchange preferences in the process of
reaching the best contract or deal. 0 When the Supreme Court fills up
an opinion with dicta, it is usually laying out a broad roadmap of its
views in the case at hand, without having to wait for other cases to
raise all the issues. So, too, committees in Congress may avoid the
effort of putting together time-consuming statutory deals by stating
their understanding of the relevant law in reports dealing with related
bills. The President can avoid the political costs of a veto by massag-
ing the signed bill with his ameliorative interpretation of its effects.5 1
Signals express not only an institution's preferences, but also the inten-
sity of those preferences. Strongly directive dicta, committee report
language, and presidential signing or veto statements put other institu-
tions on notice that they are in for a fight if they ignore the messages
being sent.
Compared with formal overrides, signalling is also a less conflictual
way for lawmaking institutions to communicate with one another.
Without actually striking down federal legislation, the Supreme Court
can lay out limitations on congressional authority through dicta in
constitutional opinions and narrow constructions of statutes that ven-
ture close to constitutional boundaries. The Court rationally sends
such signals to avoid unnecessary conffict with an institution that can
hurt the Court badly.5 2 Congress rationally attends to such signals be-
cause the Court in turn can undermine congressional interests by nar-
rowly construing or by invalidating statutes.
This kind of signalling among lawmaking institutions has the sys-
temic advantage of resolving most institutional disputes without open,
mutually destructive conflict. Over a period of time, moreover, signals
and actions consistent with those signals can be a way that interde-
50 See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 53-54 (3d ed. 1953).
s See Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpreta-
tions of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 363,
363, 366 (1987); William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique,
66 IND. L.J. 699, 700-01, 704-07 (x99i).
52 Although the congressional powers to override the Court by proposing constitutional
amendments, to impeach and to remove Justices, and to strip the Court of jurisdiction over speci-
fied classes of cases are hard to invoke, their mere threat may have some effect. See MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126-31 (1982); Segal, supra note
37, at 383-86. It is easier for Congress to hurt the Court by refusing to raise judicial salaries to
keep up with inflation, by ignoring the Chief Justice's administrative and personnel requests, and
by overloading the judiciary with too many cases. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 345-47 (1988). Sustained congressional criticism of the Court
may lower the Court's prestige as well.
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pendent institutions create implicit bargains. 53 Institutions have differ-
ing priorities as well as preferences about public law issues. Their
differing preferences create risks of conflict, but their differing priori-
ties offer ways to minimize or to avoid conflict. By a series of signals
and actions, the coordinate institutions can indicate their priorities and
their willingness to reach deals whereby each institution defers to the
most important preferences of the others.
On the other hand, if institutions are competing rather than coop-
erating, signals must be viewed differently. Like bluffs in poker or
false-carding in bridge, signals might be a way for one institution to
gain strategic advantages over its competitors, by suggesting a state of
affairs that would discourage the other institutions from aggressively
pursuing those interests.5 4 Because the Supreme Court, the President,
and Congress are competitors for national power as well as cooperat-
ing institutions, we would expect both sincere signals and bluffs in
these institutions' bargaining games.s5
Marbury v. Madison5 6 illustrates this complexity. By refusing to
participate or to file papers in the case, Secretary of State Madison
signalled the Jeffersonian Administration's possible defiance, which
Congress seconded by abolishing the 1802 Term of the Court.5 7 These
signals were credible to the Court, which signalled its own disapproval
of the administration by declaring the refusal to deliver Marbury's
commission unlawful, but avoided a mandamus by invalidating the
statute purportedly giving the Court jurisdiction to hear the case. The
Court's holding set out the power of judicial review and signalled the
Marshall Court's willingness to strike down the administration's acts
in other settings. This was probably a bluff on the part of the Court,
which struck down national legislation only twice before the Civil
War.5 8 In this century, the Court has raiely deployed its judicial re-
53 See John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War
Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 293, 294, 295-96, 299-302 (1993).
S4 See VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 5o, at S1-55.
SS A further complexity is introduced by the incentives members of the Court or Congress
have to generate signals that reflect their own preferences but not those of the institution as a
whole. Thus, legislators through colloquies and judges through concurring opinions try to influ-
ence the law, but their efforts are usually recognized as bluffs. Tougher calls are posed by con-
gressional committee reports and dicta in opinions for the Court; individuals have incentives to
bluff, but the institution monitors bluffs rather effectively.
56 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (18o3).
57 See Robert L. Clinton, Game Theory, Legal History, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 38
AM. J. POL. Sci. 285, 287, 298 (i994); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. i, 5.
58 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) at 18o; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (ig How.) 393, 452
(x857).
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view powers to challenge the President's or Congress's core powers or
to thwart a powerful national political consensus.59
II. IMPLICATIONS OF LAW AS EQUILIBRIUM: THE 1993 TERM
The 1993 Term provides a laboratory for studying the implications
of understanding law as equilibrium. Our analysis is both positive and
critical. On the one hand, we maintain that viewing law as equilib-
rium suggests an easily comprehensible rationality in the Court's ap-
proach to issues of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and
administrative law. On the other hand, we maintain that the Court's
decisions are not completely explicable in terms of either formalist
(rule-of-law) or realist (policy) theory. Hence, our view of law as equi-
librium is not only a sufficient theory for the 1993 Term, but a neces-
sary one as well.
A. The Role of the Court in Constitutional Law:
Acquiescence in National Consensus,
Vigilance Against State Advantage-Taking
Constitutional cases offer the Court wide-ranging lawmaking op-
portunities, but at substantial institutional peril. When the Court in-
validates statutes as violative of the Constitution, the Court is able to
displace an existing equilibrium or, more dramatically, to establish a
new equilibrium where the Court wants it to be. The Court in those
cases can usually be overridden only by a constitutional amendment,
which is costly and impracticable because it requires supermajorities
in Congress and among the states.60 The Court's decisions invalidat-
ing state-required school prayer 61 and protecting flagburners,62 for ex-
ample, were highly unpopular and vigorously denounced by legislators,
59 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making In a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285-86 (1957). We follow Dahl's critics in believing that an
account of Supreme Court activism must take into account the Court's decisions striking down
state legislation and interpreting federal legislation narrowly. See, e.g., JOHN B. GATEs, THE
SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT 14-15, 17 (1992); Jonathan Casper, The Supreme
Court and National Policy Making, 7o AM. POL. Sc. REV. 5o, 60-62 (1976); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 296, 309-12 (1993). But we follow Dahli in maintaining that the Court does not directly
invalidate important national equilibria often. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Demand for Judi-
cial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 379 (x993).
60 See U.S. CONST. art. V; Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitu-
tion: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAss L. REV. Iii,
112 (1993); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTION.
ALISM AND DEMOCRACY 295, 218-I9 (Jon Ester & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
61 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962), reaffirmed in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,
2657 (1992).
62 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989), reaffirmed in United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310, 312, 318-i9 (iggo).
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but efforts to override them foundered on the difficult process of con-
stitutional amendment.
The costs or risks of such constitutional activism are substantial,
however.63 Judicial invalidation of congressional or presidential action
on constitutional grounds is a challenge to powerful national institu-
tions. Even if a constitutional amendment to override the Court is not
feasible, Congress or the President can hurt the Court institutionally
and, if they care deeply enough, can undermine the Court's action
through the appointments process. 64 A further risk is that the Court's
announcement of new constitutional principles often commits the
Court to an institutional investment over the long run: hearing more
cases that elaborate upon the original constitutional principle, monitor-
ing lower courts as they apply the principle, and reconsidering the
principle in light of unforeseen ramifications. Given its severely lim-
ited resources and agenda, the Court cannot make new constitutional
commitments often.65
The Court generally, and individual Justices particularly, can be
expected to consider several factors in contemplating such commit-
ments. 66 Two considerations are the intensity as well as the nature of
the Court's preferences about the issue and the likely costs of judicial
activism, discounted by the Court's tolerance for risk. Here, the
Court's institutional concerns and its substantive value preferences
work together to produce an outcome. If a risk-averse Court finds
challenged governmental action at best mildly objectionable and fore-
sees high costs of administering a new constitutional rule, the Court is
unlikely to create such a new rule. The current Court is both risk-
averse and politically conservative. Hence, this is not a Court that is
going to interfere much with the death penalty6 7 or to expand upon
the substantive element of the Due Process Clause to protect individ-
63 See ALEXANDER M. BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 199-206 (1962); ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175-81 (ig7o).
64 See supra note 52.
65 "[A] court that decided the equivalent of five cases such as Brown v. Board of Education in
a single year would have seen the end of the institution, I am sure," said Alexander Bickel. Con-
ference, The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, ro WAYNE
L. REV. 457, 476 (1964).
66 Like other political institutions, the Court is a collection of individuals, each of whom has
her or his own preference configuration. Indeed, because the Court consists of a small number of
individuals (nine, usually), the preferences of any one may be important. Thus, even if the insti-
tutional considerations discussed in this section were important for only one Justice (and we
would insist that they influence all or most), they could often be critical for the Court as an
institution. Since the Supreme Court takes only the "hard cases," ie., ones that have yielded
divisions in the lower courts or involve important national political issues, the Court is often
closely divided. In a closely divided (five-to-four or six-to-three) Court, one or two Justices can be
critical to the Court's decision.
67 See, e.g., 'Illaepa v. California, 114 S. CL 2630, 2636-39 (994) (Kennedy, J.); McCleskey
v. Kemp, 48z U.S. 279, 314-19 (1987) (Powell, J.); cf. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. CL 1127, 1127
(1994) (denying certiorari in capital case over the dissent of Justice Blackmun who argued "that
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ual rights,68 but it is prone to expand protection of property rights,
albeit cautiously and incrementally.69 The foregoing calculus also sug-
gests the Court's greater willingness to invalidate state legislation than
comparable national legislation, because state legislatures cannot hurt
the Court the way Congress can.
A third consideration is the Court's preference for leaving rulemak-
ing about constitutional values to Congress or the states in some cases.
This factor is important because of an asymmetry in the capacity of
the political system to override the Court in constitutional cases.
While only the supermajoritarian constitutional amendment process
can formally override the Court when it creates new individual rights,
the normal political process of statute enactment can effectively over-
ride the Court when it refuses to create individual rights. The Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982,70 for example, were Congress's re-
sponse to the Court's refusal in 198o to apply the Fifteenth Amend-
ment to regulate racial vote dilution in the context of at-large electoral
configurations. Knowing that Congress stands available to give
greater scope to constitutional rights may encourage the Court to err
on the side of restraint, especially when the Court is ambivalent about
such rights.7 1 Relatedly, a Court uncertain of its preferences about the
legitimacy of a state policy has an incentive to leave the issue to state-
by-state resolution through legislation or state constitutional chal-
the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitutional." Id. at 1138 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
68 See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 1i4 S. CL 8o7, 813-814 (x994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (finding no
substantive due process action for wrongful prosecution).
69 See Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.); United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. CL 492, 505 (1993) (Kennedy, J.).
70 Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 StaL 131, 134 (i982) (overriding City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 62-65 (i98o)).
71 Although the Court in this context may be criticized as unduly timid, it is usually not
viewed as hostile toward Congress or politically salient groups. If the Court interprets a statute in
a constricted fashion, Congress may be institutionally offended at the defiling of its statute, and
the beneficiaries of the law may perceive the Court as obstinately, even hostilely, refusing to defer
to their legitimate victories through the democratic process. That is the lesson of the override of
the x989 Supreme Court decisions in the Civil Rights Act of iggi. In contrast, if the Court
refuses to expand the Constitution and leaves the ultimate decision to Congress, the rhetoric is
less heated and focuses on fixing the Court's policy mistake rather than accusing the Court of
institutional reneging or of hostility toward identifiable interests. This explains the reaction to
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (99o), in which the Court
left to state legislatures, and perhaps to Congress, the responsibility of defining the right to die.
An intermediate category exists when the Court arguably cuts back on pre-existing constitutional
rights grounded in the Court's precedents and leaves Congress the option of reinstating those
rights by statute. This scenario, exemplified both by section 3 of the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments, § 3, 96 Star. at 134, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
141, 1o7 Stat. 1488 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb), leaves the Court open to charges of
double-crossing sensitive groups (racial and religious minorities, in these instances), but raises little
concern about judicial refusal to honor congressional directives.
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lenge.72 On the other hand, the Court might be motivated to some
form of activism if it believes Congress or the states will legislate inap-
propriately (recall Casey).
x. Deference to National Equilibria. - Because the current Court
seems risk-averse, is unified on only a few intensely felt issues, and
understands that the other two branches (during the 1993 Term con-
trolled by the Democrats) view the largely Republican-appointed Court
with some suspicion, we should not often expect the Court to upset
national political equilibria, The 1993 Term's only overt constitutional
activism involving federal law was United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property.7 3 A closely divided Court held that the Constitu-
tion requires that notice and an opportunity for a hearing be afforded
before real property is seized under the Drug Enforcement Act of
197o. Although the Department of Justice howled, the decision cre-
ated no stir in the Capitol because it was not felt to have undermined
fundamentally the statutory scheme and because imposing protective
procedures has traditionally been the province of the Court. Decided
at the beginning of the Term, James Daniel Good was followed by an
uninterrupted streak of decisions deferential to national political
equilibria.
Although the Constitution is replete with explicit protections for
criminal defendants, the conservative and statist Rehnquist Court is
unlikely to apply them vigorously, and it did not this Term.7 4 Indeed,
the only explicit overruling of a precedent of the Court during the
1993 Term came in Nichols v. United States,75 which narrowed the
right to counsel articulated by the Burger Court. Although Nichols
might be viewed simply as a product of the Court's substantive values
concerning criminal procedures, it also illustrates several interesting
features of the Court's institutionally strategic behavior. Because Con-
gress and the President have grown increasingly conservative as to the
procedural rights of criminal defendants, the Court has substantial
freedom to implement its own strongly held conservative preferences,
without fear of override. In order to achieve its substantive "law and
72 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
go HARv. L. REV. 489, 502-03 (1977). This theory would reconcile San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. i, 54-55 (i973), which rejected an equal protection challenge to inequali-
ties in state spending on education, with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982), which al-
lowed an equal protection challenge to state exclusion of illegal aliens from its school system. In
the former case, at least one Justice (Powell, perhaps) expected more effective redress under state
constitutions, as was the case. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392
(Tex. ig8g).
73 114 S. CL 492 (1993) (Kennedy, J.).
74 See Davis v. United States, 114 S. CL 2350, 2354-57 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (refusing to
expand Miranda); see also cases cited infra note 95 (upholding almost all challenged state-level
procedures for criminal defendants).
75 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (overruling Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222
(ig8o) (per curiam)).
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order" agenda, the Rehnquist Court has compromised the rule-of-law
values of stare decisis in Nichols7 6 and earlier decisions narrowing
criminal procedural rights.77 These cases exemplify a more general
proposition: to the Court, stare decisis considerations are least compel-
ling for prior decisions that expanded constitutional rights, because
such decisions cannot easily be overridden in the normal political
process.
78
If a current President and Congress are united in favor of a na-
tional policy, the Court is unlikely to invalidate the policy. Weiss v.
United States79 rejected constitutional challenges to the institution of
"military judges," who are ordinary officers assigned on an ad hoc ba-
sis for indeterminate terms to adjudicate court martials. Such a casual
judiciary would violate the Due Process Clause in most civilian con-
texts, but the Court deferred to a practice accepted by Congress and
the President in the military context.8 0 Deference to a Congress-Presi-
dent consensus provided an even more compelling reason for the
Court to reject the Appointments Clause issue presented by this prac-
tice, because the Court has no institutional reason to invalidate on sep-
aration-of-powers grounds a practice that has yielded no interbranch
conflict.8 ' In contrast, the Court can be expected to fragment (often
contentiously) if Congress and the President take opposing sides on a
separation-of-powers issue.8 2 Nonetheless, the Court thrives on such
76 See Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1931-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77 See Payne v. Tennessee, Soi U.S. 808, 828-29 (iggi) (Rehnquist, Cj.) (stating that stare
decisis concerns are not strongly implicated when the Court overrules criminal procedure deci-
sions "decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents"); California v. Acevedo, 5oo
U.S. 565, 576-79 (ggi) (Blackmun, J.); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (iggo) (Rehnquist,
CJ.); Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802-803 (1989) (Rehnquist, CJ.); see also Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 436, 450-51 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (overruling precedent protecting court-
martial defendants). But see Payne, Soi U.S. at 834-35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (defending the
overruling of activist precedents as consistent with stare decisis principles). For decisions overrul-
ing habeas precedents, see infra note 230.
78 Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (observing relaxed stare decisis "in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible"). We would supplement Brandeis's rule with
the caveat that rights-denying constitutional decisions (which can be overridden by Congress)
should be harder to overrule than ights-creating decisions (which cannot easily be overridden).
The Court's greater willingness to overrule precedent in order to contract (rather than expand)
constitutional rights because Congress can override such restrictive decisions through normal leg-
islation, suggests a willingness by the Court to recognize that greater interplay between the
branches may be desirable. See Payne, 5oz U.S. at 828-29. That is, the Court may be willing to
narrowly construe constitutional rights precisely because it wants to increase legislative participa-
tion in constitutional interpretation, even at the risk of making a legislative override more
feasible.
'9 114 S. CL 752, 754-55 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
80 See id. at 76o-62; id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring).
81 See id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 757-58 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting apparent stat-
utory authorization for this practice).
82 Consider the Court's divisions in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (i986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982). On the Court's notorious vacil-
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cases, for the Court's prestige is enhanced if the other branches must
turn to it for an authoritative adjudication of their powers.
It is apparent that it is the views of the current President and Con-
gress that have import for the Court's institutionally strategic behav-
ior. In Turner Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,83 the Court reviewed new
requirements that cable television systems dedicate a specified portion
of their channels to local commercial and public broadcasting stations.
Congress imposed the requirements in the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992,84 the first statute passed over
President Bush's veto. The Clinton Administration has supported the
Act's policy. The Court diluted traditional First Amendment analysis
in this case to defer temporarily to Congress and the new administra-
tion. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court declined to apply "strict
scrutiny" to the "must carry" provisions, by categorizing the Act's reg-
ulation of cable company offerings as a "content neutral" measure
designed "to preserve access to free television programming for the 40
percent of Americans without cable.115  But the statute's insistence
that cable companies program local stations and public broadcasting
stations appears to be animated by what those stations are likely to
say, and that is content-based.8 6 For this reason, a state cannot im-
pose "local news" and "public interest" requirements on local newspa-
pers, even if most communities have only one newspaper.8 7  This
doctrinal conundrum is explained by a view of law as equilibrium.
The Court has allowed the federal government a wide berth in regu-
lating broadcast media at the national level, but has afforded state
governments little discretion in regulating the print media at the local
level.8 8  This phenomenon is in large part the consequence of the
lation in these cases, see Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV.
io5, io5-o6 (1988); Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 513-24 (1989).
83 114 S. CL 2445 (994) (Kennedy, J.).
84 Pub. L. No. 102-385, io6 Stat. 246o.
85 Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. CL at 246o-64 (Kennedy, J.). Applying the intermediate scru-
tiny of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), Justice Kennedy found the government
interests purportedly advanced by the Act to be substantial, but remanded for further factfinding
as to whether the "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470, 2472
(Kennedy, J., for a plurality) (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); see id. at 2473 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in order to establish a judgment of the Court).
86 See Turner Broadcasting, i14 S. Ct. at 2476-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (i974). But cf. Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2464-66 (Kennedy, J., for a plurality) (distinguishing Tornillo).
88 Compare Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (holding that a Florida statute that created a right to
reply to press criticism of a candidate for nomination or election violated First Amendment guar-
antees of a free press) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392-95 (1969)
(upholding FCC's fairness doctrine for television, relying on the untenable explanation that the
airwaves represent a limited forum) and NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (ap-
plying a lenient standard of review to FCC regulation of radio, with similar rationale). The plu-
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Court's inclination to defer more readily to national but not local
political consensus on controversial issues.89
A similar phenomenon is apparent in the Court's voting rights
cases. During the 1992 Term, the Court opened up the state redistrict-
ing process to reverse-discrimination challenges in Shaw v. Reno. 90
The racial gerrymandering in Shaw was adopted by North Carolina in
response to the Attorney General's refusal to "preclear" an earlier re-
districting plan, as required under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
If the Attorney General's broad interpretation of section 5, and the
Supreme Court's use of racial proportionality as a criterion for estab-
lishing vote dilution under section 2 of the Act, together require the
creation of districts like those in Shaw, then the door is open for a
successful constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act itself. Jus-
tice Thomas suggested such a challenge this Term in two decisions
applying the Act, Holder v. Hall91 and Johnson v. De Grandy.92 But
a majority of the Court, including Shaw author Justice O'Connor,
were disposed to avoid a repeat of i982's congressional override fol-
lowing a restrictive reading of the Act, and preferred to develop con-
stitutional limits through lawsuits to invalidate state redistricting
efforts in response to the Act.
93
To protect the Act itself from challenge, however, the current
Court interprets the Act cautiously. In both Voting Rights Act cases
rality opinion in Turner Broadcasting properly declined to extend the much-criticized limited
broadcast spectrum rationale of Red LionlNBC to assess the regulation of cable, see Trner
Broadcasting, i4 S. Ct. at 2456-58 (Kennedy, J., for a plurality), but accomplished much the
same result by characterizing the regulation as content-neutral. We are inclined to believe that
the reasoning in all these decisions is makeweight and that Tornillo and Red Lion (and Turner
Broadcasting) can best be reconciled by reference to the "paramount importance" to the Court "of
according substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress." Id. at 2472 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
89 Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-93 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
for a plurality) (giving less deference to state or local affirmative action policies than to congres-
sional ones) with Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (i9go) (Brennan, J.)
(deferring, with a divided Court, to congressionally deliberated affirmative action policy, adopted
over presidential opposition).
90 113 S. CL 2816, 2832 (i993) (O'Connor, J.).
91 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2592, 2618 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
92 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2667 (i994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 2664-67
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Voting Rights
Act should be cautiously applied, in light of constitutional concerns).
93 See Vera v. Richards, No. CIV.A.H-94-o277, 1994 WL 484492, at *2 (S.D. "Tex. Aug. 17,
1994) (holding three gerrymandered congressional districts unconstitutional under Shaw); Hays v.
State, No. 92-S22, 1994 WL 477159, at *i (W.D. La. July 29, 1994) (invalidating Louisiana dis-
tricts as racial gerrymandering); Brooks v. State Bd. of Elections, 848 F. Supp. 1548, 155' (S.D.
Ga. 1994) (rejecting consent decree altering method of electing state judges). But see Shaw v.
Hunt, No. 9 2-202-CIV-5-BR, 1994 WL 457269, at *x (E.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 1994) (on remand from
Supreme Court) (holding that North Carolina's districts pass strict scrutiny because they further
state's compelling interest in complying with Voting Rights Act).
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this Term, the Court rejected broad readings of the statute that might
have encouraged states trying to comply with the statute to engage in
constitutionally suspect districting practices. 94 Thus, although the
Court in both cases deferred to electoral decision§ made at the state or
local level, any deference to local efforts to comply with the Voting
Rights Act may be in part to prevent potential constitutional problems
and thereby to avoid a confrontation with the national legislative/exec-
utive consensus represented by the Voting Rights Act.
2. Libertarian Reversal of State Equilibria. - The contrast be-
tween Shaw and De Grandy suggests that the Court is less deferential
to institutions that cannot respond as effectively (the states as opposed
to Congress); in such cases, the Court's conservative values tend to
manifest themselves most strikingly. Not surprisingly, the Court that
during the 1993 Term upheld virtually all challenged federal policies
against attack struck down all or part of local laws or policies in
eleven of nineteen individual rights cases and laid out new constitu-
tional restrictions on state action in two cases.95 The differential level
of activism must not be overstated, however. Because of the Court's
94 In Holder, a majority of the Court declined to read § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as author-
izing vote-dilution challenges to the size of a governing body. See Holder, 114 S. CL at 2588
(Kennedy, J., for a plurality); id. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); id. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). In De Grandy, the Court held that
vote dilution could not necessarily be inferred from a failure to maximize majority-minority dis-
tricts. See De Grandy, i4 S. CL at 2659-60.
95 The Court struck down state action (at least in part) in a number of cases. See Interna-
tional Union, UMWA v. Bagwell, ii4 S. Ct. 2552 (1994) (Blackmun, J.) (due process); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. CL 2516 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (free speech and assembly); Board
of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (i994) (Souter, J.) (establishment of religion); Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 1i4 S. CL 2331 (i994) (Stevens, J.) (due process); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 14 S. CL
2309 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (takings); Simmons v. South Carolina, ii4 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (Black-
mun, J., for a plurality); id. at 2200 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (due process in
death cases); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy,
114 S. CL 2o84 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (commercial speech); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038
(1994) (Stevens, J.) (free speech at home); Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. CL 1937
(1994) (Stevens, J.) (double jeopardy); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
(Blackmun, J.) (equal protection, gender); Powell v. Nevada, 14 S. Ct. 1280 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.)
(probable cause).
The Court imposed new constitutional obligations on states, without outright invalidation of
their laws, in two cases. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. CL 1970 (1994) (Souter, J.) (remanding
for more fact development in a case involving cruel and unusual punishment in conditions of
confinement); Waters v. Churchill, i14 S. CL 1878 (1994) (O'Connor, J., for a plurality) (involving
free expression in the state workplace for state employees).
The Court sustained challenged state action in a number of cases. See Tuilaepa v. California,
114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994) (Kennedy, J.) (cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty); Romano v.
Oklahoma, 114 S. CL 2004 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (due process in death cases); Stansbury v.
California, 114 S. CL 1526 (1994) (per curiam) (self-incrimination); Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. CL
1239 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (due process, burden of proof in criminal cases); Albright v. Oliver, 114
S. CL 807 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ., for a plurality); id. at 817 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 8i9 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (due process, malicious arrest and
prosecution); Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (double jeopardy).
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discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, state policies usually escaped judi-
cial review altogether, and most of the decisions creating new individ-
ual protections against state officials would apply to federal officials as
well.
The Court's activism strongly reflected the Justices' substantive
desire to protect citizens against unjustified state intrusions, especially
intrusions for aesthetic or environmental purposes.96 Americans
should be secure in their personal safety,9 7 property,98 homes,9 9 and
businesses. Emphatically developing this last security, the Court in
Dolan v. City of Tigard'O° invalidated as an uncompensated taking the
city's conditioning of a building permit upon a store owner's willing-
ness to devote part of her property to a bike pathway and a flood
greenway. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a closely divided
Court conceded that he was imposing a new and unprecedented re-
quirement on local governments, which now must show a "rough pro-
portionality" or a "reasonable relationship" between a required land
use upon which a building permit is conditioned and the public costs
of the proposed development. 10 ' The decision is remarkable in light of
the Rehnquist Court's lack of interest in developing a rule against "un-
constitutional conditions" in cases in which liberty rather than prop-
erty rights are burdened by national regulations.10 2 Dolan reveals the
same casual treatment of precedent when reviewing state laws that we
noted in the federal law cases. The decision also illustrates how the
Court's lawmaking authority in constitutional cases can empower spe-
cific groups (landowners, shopkeepers) at the expense of other groups
(environmentalists, local governments). In short, the Court's exploita-
tion of lawmaking opportunities in cases such as Dolan has distribu-
tional consequences. Here, as in the criminal process context, where
96 This theme was implicated in none of the six cases completely upholding state action, be-
cause they all involved rights of death row inmates and alleged criminal perpetrators.
97 See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. CL 1127, 1128 (i994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (denying certio-
rari in death penalty case).
98 "Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights." United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (i993) (Kennedy, J.); cf. id. at Si5 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's holding but strongly approving of the Court's newfound
interest in property rights).
99 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct 2038, 2047 (I994) (Stevens, J.) (overturning ban on
resident signs and emphasizing invasion of the privacy of one's home).
100 114 S. CL 2309 (i994).
101 Id. at 2319; cf. id. at 2322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's new rule
"erect[s] a new constitutional hurdle in the path" of state attempts to impose development condi-
tions and arguing that the "new test on which the Court settles is not naturally derived" from the
state court decisions on which the Court relies); id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Dolan case does not present "a suitable vehicle for taking the law beyond" its current state).
102 See Rust v. Sullivan, 5oo U.S. 173, 203 (iggi) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (allowing federal govern-
ment to impose restrictions on medical consultations about abortion in connection with federal
funding); cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 2o6-2 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (giving broad
deference to attachment of conditions to federal funds for state roadbuilding).
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the risk of override is low, the Court can bend precedent to enshrine
its own substantive agenda.
The dormant commerce clause cases reveal another feature of the
Court's substantive agenda. The Court frequently strikes down state
and local policies for imposing unacceptable burdens on "free trade
among the several States."10 3 Unfortunately, the Court does not have
a coherent theory of what is "unacceptable." C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown104 evaluated an ordinance that required solid
waste to be processed at one local transfer station. Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court struck down the ordinance as an unjustified
"discrimination" against out-of-state commerce. Concurring in the
judgment, Justice O'Connor applied a balancing test and concluded
that the town's regulatory objectives did not justify the excessive bur-
dens imposed on interstate commerce.10 5 Both approaches are well-
grounded in the Court's precedents and are plausible ways of enforc-
ing the national market objectives of the Court-created doctrine. As
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion argued, however, the majority Jus-
tices slighted the town's regulatory objective, which was not protec-
tionist but assertedly arose out of a need to centralize local trash
processing.
0 6
Positive political theory provides some support for Justice Souter's
position. The Constitution contemplates that state and local govern-
ments will be the primary engines of "developmental" policies designed
to improve the local economy and "allocative" policies designed to con-
trol the day-to-day operation of government services. A respectable
body of political theory suggests that the Framers' choice was a wise
one; local governments will tend to adopt efficient policies to avoid
losing desirable citizens who vote with their feet to abandon poorly
functioning regimes.' 0 7 For similar reasons, local governments will
tend not to adopt purely redistributive policies - unless they can re-
103 Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. x8r5, 1822 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (state use
tax); see West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 22,7-18 (i994) (Stevens, J.) (state
milk pricing order); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,
1350 ('994) (Thomas, J.) (surcharge for out-of-state solid waste).
104 114 S. CL 1677 ('994).
105 See id. at 1687 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
106 See id. at 1696-98 (Souter, J., dissenting). Because the trash processing center was ulti-
mately to be turned over to the town itself, the policies of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 808-ag (1976), which held that the dormant commerce clause does not apply to state
purchasing decisions, were implicated as well.
107 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political
Theory of American Federalism, VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994) (drawing from PAUL E. P_-
TERSEN, CITY LIMITs ch. 4 (i981)). Also, most allocative and many developmental policies are
more effectively devised and operated at the local level. See Deborah J. Merritt, The Guaranty
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988).
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distribute wealth from outsiders to their own citizens.10 8  Other than
Carbone, all the decisions last Term striking down state or local poli-
cies under the dormant commerce clause involved apparent efforts to
redistribute costs and burdens from the local citizenry to outsiders.
The Court in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy'0 9 for the first time struck
down a subsidy-with-tax scheme that indirectly - but unmistakably
- redistributed resources in the same way. Carbone, by contrast, in-
volved what appears to have been a classic allocative measure. The
ordinance did discriminate against out-of-state processors, but also
against competitors within the locality. It struck Justice Souter, and
strikes us, as the sort of lawmaking that need not be regulated by the
Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Carbone illustrated an-
other distinctive feature of the dormant commerce clause cases. Un-
like other decisions interpreting the Constitution, those invoking as
well as refusing to invoke the dormant commerce clause can be over-
ridden by Congress." 0 Unlike congressional overrides of the Court's
statutory decisions, though, Congress can only authorize a dormant
commerce clause violation if it does so in "unmistakably clear"
terms."' The possibility of congressional correction, combined with
the wide acceptance in national politics of the free national market
principle, has encouraged the Court to give free reign to its own free
market preferences and to invest substantial resources in its dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence." 2 Conversely, congressional signals or
statutes approving state policies that affect interstate commerce ought
to induce the Court to apply a more lenient standard of review. Sev-
eral of the Court's dormant commerce clause cases astutely followed
such congressional signals and upheld challenged state burdens on in-
terstate or international commerce. For example, Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Board" 3 relied on
108 See Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COM-
MENT. 395, 404 (1986); Mark V. Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, x979 WIs.
L. REv. 125, 128 n.14.
109 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2212-15 (1994) (Stevens, J.).
110 See Farber, supra note io8, at 404.
111 Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1691 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see William Cohen,
Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old
Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 398-99 (1983); cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2608, 2617 (1992) (Stevens, J.) (finding Supremacy Clause pre-emption of traditional state alloca-
tive functions only when such is the "clear and manifest purpose" of Congress).
112 A congressional override of a judicial invalidation of a state policy under the dormant com-
merce clause is unlikely to damage the Court. These cases involve pure policy judgments about
economic deregulation at the state and local level in pursuit of national free market values, where
no federal statute addresses the issue. Losing parties are unlikely to feel invidiously scorned by
the Court, and Congress has had none of its statutes frustrated by judicial misinterpretation.
Contrast our discussion of the criminal procedure cases, in which the preferences of both the
Court and Congress press against judicial activism. See supra pp. 45-46.
113 114 S. Ct. 2268 (994).
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congressional signals of approval to uphold California's method of tax-
ing multinational companies against dormant commerce clause
attack. 114
3. The Disappearance of Carolene Products and Judicial Solicitude
for Discrete and Insular Minorities. - Chief Justice Stone's tanta-
lizing footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 1 15 sug-
gested that the Court may show less deference to the legislature when
legislation (i) on its face appears to violate a specific prohibition of the
Constitution; (2) restricts those political processes which can cause the
repeal of legislation, such as the right to vote, disseminate information
and assemble peaceably; or (3) is "directed at particular religious . . .
or national . . . or racial minorities" or is inspired by "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities." Footnote four has fascinated
scholars for two generations 1 6 and is the basis for Professor Ely's bril-
liant "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review, 117 but it is
not a robust theory for understanding the Supreme Court, as we now
explain.
The Supreme Court is an institution of national power. The nomi-
nation and appointment process ensures that the Court will ordinarily
include at least some politically well-connected insiders who reflect the
ideology of the current governing coalition. Those members of the
Court whose ideologies conflict with the current governing coalition
will likely be fearful of overrides and other forms of discipline from
other institutions. Even were the Court inclined to be counter-hege-
monic, the complex system of implicit bargains the Court has made
with the coordinate branches of national government narrow the
Court's doctrinal options, preventing the Court from challenging the
positions of other branches. Significantly, groups truly marginalized
by the political process may not have the resources or the energy to
adjudicate successfully through the Supreme Court level. These struc-
tural features of the Court's position in the federal system make the
Court an unlikely ally for outsider groups challenging stable national
equilibria, as we found above.
For analogous reasons, the Court will not displace state and local
equilibria to enforce Carolene values. Instead, the Court will enforce
either its own values or stable national equilibria. For example, Dolan
114 See id. at 2283-86; see also Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. CL 855, 86r-66
(1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (upholding airport user fees under federal law which overrode Court's earlier
dormant commerce clause precedent).
115 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
116 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 743-44
(1985) (arguing that footnote four endowed the Bill of Rights with a false "specificity"); Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and
the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 685, 689-716 (i991) (asserting that
footnote four has retained its appropriateness in the current political environment).
117 See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-104 (1980).
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and Carbone invalidated ordinances that did not violate the plain
meaning of any constitutional provision 118 and that did not involve
any apparent dysfunction in the political process. The decisions
benefitted interests (shopkeepers and waste processors) presumably
well-represented in local politics. Neither decision was compelled by
precedent. Both represented the Court's imposition of its own eco-
nomic libertarian values upon local populations.
If anything, the Court's equal protection jurisprudence has shown
an "inverted Carolene" quality: so long as a group really is politically
marginalized, the Court will tolerate virtually any action by Congress
or the states that adversely affects the minority; it is only when a mi-
nority is becoming a key player in national politics that the Court con-
stitutionalizes longstanding concerns about discrimination. Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 119
prohibiting sex-based discrimination in jury selection, recounted the
history of sex discrimination in state jury systems. Although women
have never been an "insular minority" in United States history (women
are discrete but neither isolated nor a numerical minority), they have
been politically marginalized for most of it. Yet the Warren Court -
the inspiration for Ely's representation-reinforcing theory - held that
women could constitutionally be exempted from jury service.120 In-
deed, until i971, the Supreme Court had never invalidated a state or
local law that differentiated on the basis of sex. In the 197os, when
women won congressional super-majorities and almost obtained state
ratification for the Equal Rights Amendment, the Supreme Court in-
validated sex classifications right and left.121
J.E.B. extended precedent which had held that litigants cannot use
their peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors because of their
race or ethnicity122 to invalidate sex-based challenges. It is ironic that
a conservative Court would issue such a sweeping statement of the
invidiousness of sex-based discrimination at a point when women have
enough clout to achieve most of their goals through the legislature.
118 Carbone and the other dormant commerce clause cases do not even have a constitutional
referent. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 n.9 (1994) (applying the doc-
trine of the "negative" Commerce Clause, which is not expressed in the Commerce Clause itself
but was developed in a line of Supreme Court cases); id. at 2219-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Dolan arose under the Takings Clause, but the Court invalidated a "regulation" or a
"condition" of the sort that it had never invalidated before; there was no physical "taking" as that
term is ordinarily used.
119 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-25 (994).
120 See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58-69 (z96x), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 533-35 (I975).
121 See J.E.B., 14 S. Ct. at 1424-25 (surveying cases in which the Court addressed discrimina-
tion against women).
122 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Soo
U.S. 614, 63o-31 (I99i); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 45-16 (i991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, ioo (x986).
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J.E.B. illustrates an important feature of law as equilibrium: the
deeper changes in law, including constitutional law, occur when the
relative social, economic, and political power of affected groups
changes. Although informal attitudes toward gender have been stub-
born, and women do not yet work or play on equal terms with men,
the law began to witness a sea change once women's interests were
more aggressively pressed upon, and within, the political system.'
23
Contrast the legal fate of the Satmar Hasidim. The Satmar, a sect
of Judaism whose members live together in isolated communities of
religious devotion, are the classic "discrete and insular minority." For
the most part, the residents of the Village of Kiryas Joel in New York
State educate their children in private religious schools. However,
these religious schools have been unable to provide the special educa-
tional services to handicapped children that are required by federal
and state law. 124 A local public school district temporarily provided
special services at an annex to one of the village's religious schools,
but the district stopped doing so in accordance with Supreme Court
decisions finding such arrangements in conflict with the Establishment
Clause. 25 Because the handicapped Satmar children suffered trauma
when educated in public schools outside of their religious community,
the New York legislature enacted a special statute establishing the Vil-
lage as its own school district so that special education services could
be provided to children with learning disabilities. In Board of Educa-
tion of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,12 6 the Court struck down this accommo-
dation as violative of the Establishment Clause. The legal box into
which the Court put the Satmar penalized them beyond the typical
neglect the Court has shown for cultural outsiders. 127 In Grumet, the
Court not only struck down a local policy designed to protect a group
of true outsiders; it struck down a policy that was designed in part to
123 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., ii4 S. CL 2516, 2523-25 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.j.)
(applying an intermediate rather than strict application of First Amendment principles to allow
regulation of anti-abortion protesters); NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 8o3-o6 (i994) (Rehn-
quist, CJ.) (allowing RICO lawsuits against groups attempting to shut down abortion clinics);
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 37, (i993) (O'Connor, J.) (allowing hostile work environ-
ment lawsuits under Title VII even if there is no physical or psychological injury).
124 See Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988); N.Y. EDUC. LAW,
art. 89 (McKinney ig8i).
125 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985) (disallowing a secular annex at the reli-
gious school); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381-98 (1985).
126 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
127 The federal and state laws protecting students with disabilities have pushed a voluntarily
isolated group into continuous dealings with the state. It is ironic that, despite the holding in
Grumet, five of the Justices suggested - but only suggested - that Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985), should be overruled. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("The Court should, in a proper case, be prepared to reconsider
Aguilar); id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Aguilar may have been errone-
ous"); id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Aguilar and several other cases, presumably
including Kiryas Joel, "should be overruled at the earliest opportunity").
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implement the product of a national consensus, the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act.
B. The Role of the Court in Statutory Interpretation:
Ratification, Evolution, and Ground Rules
The Supreme Court performs three systemic roles in statutory in-
terpretation: it implements statutory agreements, reshapes those deals
to adapt to changed circumstances, and announces the ground rules
for predicting the effect of contemplated statutes.
For rule-of-law reasons, the Court owes substantial loyalty to the
Congress that enacts a statute. A Court engaged in statutory interpre-
tation will also be attuned to the interests of the current Congress,
whose preferences will be complex. Because the Court and Congress
are institutional repeat players, the current Congress will want the
Court to respect the wishes of the enacting Congress, just as the cur-
rent Congress hopes its own wishes will later be respected. 128 For re-
cent statutes, this current congressional preference will be strong,
because the enacting coalition will still be potent and most of its mem-
bers will still be in Congress. For older statutes, the calculation
changes. Ex ante, it seems less important to any given Congress that
its deals be maintained beyond the period in which the impetus for the
legislation remains unchanged. Indeed, a rational legislator, ex ante,
might well prefer judicial interpretation to accommodate changed cir-
cumstances and to avoid frustrating statutory purposes. 129 Addition-
ally, over time the legislative sponsors and supporters of the statute
leave office and are replaced by others who are often less interested in
prior controversies. As the social and congressional landscape changes
after the enactment of the statute, the Court frequently has greater
freedom to undo parts of the statutory deal without much fear of
override.
This erosion in allegiance to the enacting Congress is coupled with
a second role for the Court: applying statutes to new circumstances.
This role is especially important when those circumstances involve un-
contemplated consequences of the statute. In such cases, the Court
may well be more concerned with the preferences of the current rather
than the enacting Congress, for the current Congress will better reflect
the distributional balance of power in the country. Relatedly, the
Court has substantial discretion in applying statutes to unanticipated
128 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878-87 ('975).
129 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Gao. L.J.
28I, 3o9-14 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 885, 921-41 (i985) (arguing that the original intent doctrine began as a means of struc-
tural interpretation deferring to state power and autonomy, not to the individual beliefs of the
Framers).
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circumstances, and the Court may often distribute statutory entitle-
ments without regard for the wishes of Congress. Nevertheless, the
Court would still be concerned with treading on current legislative
prerogatives, which could trigger an override.
Finally, the current Congress is very interested in knowing how the
Court might apply its statutes in the immediate future (Congress un-
derstands that all bets are off in the distant future, for the reasons
discussed above). Hence, the Court has something of an obligation to
convey to Congress those signals that will help Congress more system-
atically anticipate how the Court will interpret statutes. Those ground
rules are not distributionally neutral. This setting of ground rules rep-
resents another opportunity for the Court to affect the distribution of
rights and duties.
The plurality of roles and variety of pressures render it highly un-
likely that the Court will adhere to any single foundation for interpret-
ing statutes. As we have demonstrated elsewhere, the Court does not
adhere to any single foundation for statutory meaning, but has tradi-
tionally followed a multi-factored, pragmatic approach to statutory in-
terpretation that shows certain regularities. 130  In this section we will
explore those regularities - the primacy of statutory text supple-
mented by legislative history, the role of evolutive factors, and the im-
portance of canonical norms - in light of the institutional features of
lawmaking.
i. Implementation: The Primacy of Text, Supplemented by Legisla-
tive History. - An institutional perspective complements the tradi-
tional rule-of-law view that statutory text should be the key source of
statutory meaning. The text of a statute is the most obvious "focal
point" for law in our culture. 13' So long as statutory text is the pri-
mary means by which citizens, agencies, and courts coordinate their
understandings about law's equilibrium, text must be the starting
point for statutory interpretation.
132
Especially for recently enacted statutes, the focal value of the text
is enhanced by another consideration: the text is usually evidence of
130 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 345-62 (iggo); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 7o TEx. L. REv. 1073, 1101-13 (1992).
131 See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, i9go Sup. CT. REV. 231, 246-49 (observing that the Supreme Court in x989 tended to
apply "plain meaning" analysis in statutory interpretation cases). On the theory of focal points,
consult THoMAS C. SCHELULNG, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 68-70, 111-13 (ig6o).
132 Of the 56 statutory interpretation decisions of the 1993 Term, we believe that only two are
flatly inconsistent with the statutory text, Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., for
a plurality;, Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) and BFP v. Resolution Rust
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 757 (1994) (Scalia, J.); and two more are inconsistent with a sensible reading of
the text- MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., x4 S. Ct. 2223 (i994) (Scalia, J.) and Ratzlaf v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.). We explain below why we think these deci-
sions departed from the statutory text.
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current political consensus. An interpretation in i994 slighting the ap-
parent meaning of a statute enacted in i99i is likely to upset the coali-
tion that produced the statute and, if the coalition is still powerful,
subject the Court to the risk of a conflictual override. Many statutory
cases that reach the Court involve statutes enacted by recent Con-
gresses, and a third of the statutory cases in the 1993 Term involved
statutes enacted in the previous fifteen years. 133 Not surprisingly, the
Court routinely followed the plain meaning in cases involving recently
enacted statutes, but not in cases involving older laws.
134
That the Court relies primarily on textual analysis does not mean
that it does so persuasively, however. The Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act of 197o, as implemented by regulation, 1 3
requires financial institutions to report currency transactions larger
than $io,ooo; a criminal enforcement provision penalizes any person
"willfully violating"136 the Act. Because people outside of financial in-
stitutions were evading the 197o Act by breaking up their transactions
into increments of less than $io,ooo, Congress in the Money Launder-
ing Control Act of 1986 added a provision to the 197o Act to prohibit
anyone from "structuring" a transaction "for the purpose of evading"
the reporting requirements of the 197o Act.13 7  As a result of this
amendment, the original enforcement provision now criminalizes acts
"willfully violating" the new anti-structuring provision. This Term, the
Court, in Ratzlaf v. United States, 38 held that a jury could not con-
vict a defendant for structuring transactions in which the government
showed only that the defendant did so for the specific purpose of
evading the 197o reporting requirements.1 39 The Court imposed a fur-
133 The Court handed down 87 written decisions this Term; 56 of the decisions involved statu-
tory interpretation; 36 of the statutory decisions primarily involved statutes enacted in the last 30
years; ig of the statutory decisions primarily involved statutes enacted in the last fifteen years.
134 Of the 36 cases involving recently enacted statutes, the Court simply applied the plain
meaning in 2o cases; of the 20 cases involving statutes more than 30 years old, the Court used
plain meaning as its primary source in only 4 cases.
135 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. iri8 (i97o) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5325
(I988)); see 31 C.F.R. § I03.22(a) (993).
136 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137 Pub. L. No. 99-570, § r354(a), ioo Stat. 3207-18, 3207-22 (1986) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 5324 (1988)).
138 114 S. CL 655 (1994).
139 Waldemar and Loretta Ratzlaf were restauranteurs by occupation and high-stakes gamblers
by avocation. They transacted much of their restaurant business and gambling in cash, appar-
ently to avoid paying taxes. Waldemar admitted at trial that they kept over $ioo,ooo in cash in a
piece of bedroom furniture. In 1988, the IRS got wind of the Ratzlafs' fishy style of business and
conducted a revealing audit. See Brief for the United States at 5, Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 65s (994) (No. 92-xi96).
In 199o, the Ratzlafs arrived in Nevada with a shopping bag full of cash, which they planned
to use to pay off $16o,ooo in Waldemar's gambling debts. The casino told Waldemar that it
would have to file a report, whereupon he and Loretta went from bank to bank, purchasing
separate cashier's checks for $9,5oo. The jury found that the Ratzlafs knew of the reporting
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ther scienter requirement: the jury must also find that the defendant
specifically knew that structuring (not just evading the reporting re-
quirements) is unlawful. While this may be a (barely) plausible read-
ing of the statute, it is not the most plausible, and certainly not the
only plausible reading. If the Ratzlafs did what the government
charged in their case, they were "willfully violating" the provision that
told them not to structure transactions "for the purpose of evading"
the 197o Act's reporting requirements.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court maintained that if this al-
ternative interpretation were accepted, the enforcement provision's
"willfulness" requirement would be superfluous for anti-structuring of-
fenses.140 But the Court is frequently willing to read a statute in a
way that renders some language, or even an entire provision, superflu-
ous if the superfluity is an apparent drafting oversight.14 1 It seems
likely that Congress in 1986 was simply inattentive to possible super-
fluities. In dropping the anti-structuring provision into the Act by its
1986 amendment, Congress focused only on filling a regulatory gap,
and was apparently unaware that the new anti-structuring provision
was the only one in the revised statutory scheme that had a separate
scienter requirement.
14 2
When a recent statute does not have a plain meaning (as in our
view of RatzaJ), the Court has a strong incentive to consider the stat-
ute's legislative history to determine whether there was a legislative
deal for the Court to enforce. The Rehnquist Court cites legislative
history much less than the Burger Court did;143 the Court should be
wary of such indirect signals, for they may be bluffs on the part of
requirements and that they structured the transactions with the specific purpose of evading them.
See Ratziaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140 See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 659 (opinion for the Court).
141 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1493-95 (1994).
142 The 1986 amendment was added to resolve a split in the circuits over whether the United
States could prosecute depositors (as opposed to banks) that sought to evade the bank reporting
obligations. The Senate Report accompanying a prior bill that incorporated what would become
the anti-structuring provision stated that "a person who converts $x8,ooo in currency to cashier's
checks by purchasing two $9,ooo cashier's checks at two different banks . . . with the specific
intent that the participating bank or banks not be required to file Currency Transaction Reports
for those transactions, would be subject to potential civil and criminal liability." S. REP. No. 433,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986). Apart from supporting the government's position that Congress
did not intend to override the traditional view that "ignorance of the law" is not a defense, this
passage (and others discussed in the Brief for the United States at 35, Ratzlaf v. United States,
114 S. CL 655 (i994) (No. 92-1196)) strongly suggests that Congress did not notice the "double
scienter" language, and did not intend a double scienter requirement. Precisely this question was
asked by Senator D'Amato, and precisely this answer was given by the Justice Department. See
Hearing on S. 571 and S. 23o6 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-42 (1986).
143 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, ch. 7; Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-57 (1994). There are many examples of the
Court's critical examination of legislative history. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 2431, 2435-36 (1994) (O'Connor, J.); Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251,
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Congress or of unrepresentative members. But legislative signals can
also be evidence of political equilibrium, and so it is rational for the
Court to consider legislative history for what it is worth, even if the
statutory text appears to have a plain meaning. 144 This deepens the
mystery of Ratzlaf, which found the legislative history of the 1986 Act
inconclusive, even though the history confirmed that Congress was not
even aware of the double scienter problem. 145 In any event, the Court
is more likely to find the legislative history useful in those cases where
it finds the text of a statute ambiguous or confused.
146
The issue in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,4 7 which was argued
together with Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., was whether the new
damage provisions added to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 19i
apply to cases that were pending on appeal when the statute was en-
acted. Section 402(a) of the statute provides: "Except as otherwise spe-
cifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act
shall take effect upon enactment. 1 48 As the Court held, the statutory
text is ambiguous, because it does not tell us upon whom the Act shall
"take effect" on the date of enactment. On the one hand, courts had
previously interpreted similar "take effect" language in other amend-
ments to Title VII to be inapplicable to pending cases, and Congress's
1972 amendments to Title VII had used clearly targeted language to
assure application to pending cases. 149 On the other hand, the Act
specifically denied retroactivity to other changes adopted in the stat-
ute.'5 0 These specific retroactivity provisions would have been super-
fluous if section 402(a) were interpreted to render the whole act
2258-59 (I994) (O'Connor, J.); see also Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (1994)
(Thomas, J.) (refusing to credit committee report that had no statutory referent).
144 In the 1993 Term, the Court explicitly examined and relied on legislative history in xo of
the 36 decisions interpreting statutes enacted in the last 30 years. The legislative history was
useful in confirming that the Court's understanding of the statute's plain meaning well reflected
the underlying statutory deal. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771, 777-79
(1994) (Blackmun, J.); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct.
517, 526-27 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.). Or, at least, the legislative history showed that the Court's
understanding was not inconsistent with decisions Congress had deliberately made. See, e.g., De-
partment of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 114 S. Ct. 843, 851 (1994) (Kennedy, J.); NOW, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 8o5-o6 (I994) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
145 Compare supra note 142 (legislative history supporting dissent in RatzlaJ) with Ratzlaf, 114
S. Ct. at 662 & n.i7 (responding to none of the arguments stressed in note 142).
146 See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2659-62 (1994) (Souter, J.); Howlett v.
Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 114 S. Ct. 2057, 2062-63 (1994) (Kennedy, J.); United States v.
Granderson, i4 S. Ct. 1259, 1266-67 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 & n.9 (1994) (Souter, J.).
147 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
148 Civil Rights Act of x99', Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 2o5 Stat. 1071, 1099.
149 See Landgraf, 14 S. Ct. at 1493 n.io.
150 See iggi Act § 4 02(b) (rendering the Act prospective with regard to the overruling of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)); id. § io9(c) (specifying that the extrater-
ritorial application provision is prospective only).
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prospective only. (Recall from Ratzlaf that the Court has a presump-
tion against interpretations rendering other provisions superfluous.)
Just as we argued with respect to Ratzlaf, the text of the statute at
issue in Landgraf raises more questions than it answers about where
the deal lay.' 5 ' Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court carefully ex-
amined the legislative background of the statute, observing that the
i991 Act originated in a bill introduced in 199o to override the 1988
Term decisions. The 199o override bill stipulated that each section ap-
plied to "all proceedings pending on or commenced after" the date of
the Supreme Court decision it was intended to override. 152 But that
bill was vetoed by President Bush, in part because the President ob-
jected to the retroactivity provisions. The Senate failed by one vote
(66-34) to override the veto in i99o.'-5 A similar bill, introduced in
199i, seemed likely to meet the same fate, until an eleventh-hour com-
promise in the Senate revamped the bill so as to make it acceptable to
at least one more senator and, once the veto point was reached in the
Senate, to the President as well. Among the changes was the adoption
of section 402(a) in place of the complex and precise retroactivity pro-
visions. After the bill was passed, the Congressional Record filled up
with conflicting statements about whether it was intended to be retro-
active. 5 4 These statements indicate that Congress remained severely
divided on the issue, with Democrats generally favoring retroactivity
and Republicans almost uniformly opposing it; that President Bush
and well over one-third of the Senate were opposed to retroactivity;
and, probably, that the retroactivity issue could have undermined sup-
port for the bill, had the issue been raised more aggressively before the
vote. As Justice Stevens put it, "legislators agreed to disagree about
whether and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment con-
duct."'5 5  Thus assured that the various signals were all bluffs and
that there was no clear deal to enforce, Justice Stevens's opinion then
decided the case by invoking the Court's strong preference for statu-
tory nonretroactivity.
5 6
151 Cf. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1826 (1994) (per curiam) (holding that
nonretroactivity of iggi Act was not an obvious conclusion from the statutory text).
152 See S. 2104, ioist Cong., ist Sess. § 15 (i99o).
153 See 136 CONG. REc. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, i99o).
154 The original sponsors stated that the final bill was retroactive (except for §§ 402(b) and
iog(c)). See 137 CONG. REc. S15,485 & S15,963 (daily ed. Oct. 30 & Nov. 5, i9gi) (statements of
Sen. Kennedy); 137 CONG. REC. H 9530- 31 (daily ed. Nov. 7, r991) (Rep. Edwards); 137 CONG.
REc. H9549 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2991) (Rep. Fish). Senator Dole (R-Kan.), for himself and 13 other
Republican Senators, submitted an interpretive memorandum taking the position that the final
compromise was not retroactive. See 137 CONG. REc. S15,472 (daily ed. Oct. 3o, iggi). Senator
Danforth (R-Mo.), for himself and for six other moderate Republicans who had voted in 19go to
override the President's veto, submitted an interpretive memorandum, also taking the position
that the final compromise "shall not apply retroactively." Id. at SI5,485.
155 Landgraf, 114 S. CL at 1496.
156 See id. at 1496-1505.
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Given our hypothesis that, for recently enacted statutes, the Court
should be inclined to utilize legislative history to establish the meaning
of unclear statutory text, the Court's positive use of legislative history
in Landgraf seems at odds with its unwillingness to rely upon legisla-
tive history in Ratzlaf. This difference can, of course, be superficially
attributed to differing assessments of textual clarity. A majority of the
Landgraf Court agreed that the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
was unclear, but the majority in Ratzlaf was unwilling to "resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that [was] clear."s 7 A more
subtle explanation is available, however. Reference to legislative his-
tory in Landgraf can be explained in terms of the charged political
wrangling that led to the delicate 1991 compromise, a compromise that
the Court knew many members of Congress would be loath to see
unsettled. The statute in Ratzlaf, on the other hand, involved a rela-
tively obscure offense that seems not to have raised legislators's blood
pressures significantly during consideration and passage. Although the
Court may portray its decisions to use legislative history as based on
whether textual meaning is "plain," the very assessment of whether
text is plain may be influenced by institutional considerations.
2. Evolution: Statutory Purpose, Common Law and Statutory Prec-
edent, Post-Enactment Signals. - Statutory text never anticipates all
the issues that the statute will have to address, and over time the un-
resolved issues will multiply when social circumstances change and the
political-legal equilibrium shifts. As statutes evolve, the text loses
some of its focal power, and other considerations become increasingly
important in statutory interpretation - the purpose of the law, the
surrounding legal terrain, and statutory precedents.'- 8 The 1993 Term
was replete with cases invoking these evolutive considerations.15 9
The Federal Employers' Liability Act of 19o8 (FELA)160 gives a
cause of action for damages against railroads "to any person suffering
157 Ratzlaf v. United States, r14 S. Ct. 655, 667 (r994).
158 See, e.g., Guino CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-43 (1982);
ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, ch. 2; HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 118o-87, 1333-34.
159 See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 114 S. CL 2431, 2435 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (purpose);
Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. CL 2364, 2372-74 (1994) (Scalia, J.); id. at 2374 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (precedent); Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 114 S. CL 2239, 2245-47 (1994) (Blackmun, J.)
(precedent, legal terrain); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2o68, 2074-75 (1994) (Souter, J.) (prece-
dent); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1996-97, 2001-02 (I994) (Souter,
3.) (purpose, precedent); Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. CL 1019, 1021-23 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (pur-
pose, precedent); American Dredging Co. v. Miller, i14 S. Ct. 981, 985-87 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (prec-
edent); Hagen v. Utah, I14 S. Ct, 958, 967-70 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (subsequent legislative signals
and private interpretation); Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953-56 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (prece-
dent); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (O'Connor, J.) (purpose, prece-
dent); id. at 371-72 (Scalia, J., concurring) (precedent); Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
114 S. CL 361, 364-66 (1993) (O'Connor, J.) (purpose, precedent).
160 35 Stat. 65 (19o8) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-6o (1988)).
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injury while he is employed by such carrier.' 61 In Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Gottshall, 62 the Court confirmed a new category of FELA
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress when an employee
sustains either a physical impact or an immediate risk of such an im-
pact by reason of the carrier's negligence. Justice Thomas's opinion
for the Court argued that the statutory term "injury" is capacious
enough to include emotional distress, that the common law has over-
whelmingly endorsed this tort, and that the new cause of action would
serve the statute's remedial purposes. 63 Although the weight of au-
thority in I908 favored a simple physical impact test, Justice Thomas
adopted the more liberal zone of danger test because, he argued, it is
more consistent with the statute's remedial goals. However, he re-
jected the even more remedial common law approach, followed in
most states today, that allows recovery for bystanders; Justice Thomas
reasoned that the bystander rule was unknown to the common law in
i9o8 and subjects railroads to excessive liability. Reflecting the
Court's traditional practice, in FELA cases, of "develop[ing] a federal
common law of negligence . . .informed by reference to the evolving
common law,"' 64 Gottshall illustrates how statutes are interpreted dy-
namically when the relative social and political power of affected par-
ties (in this case, workers and railroads) changes over time. At the
same time, the Court's rejection of the common-law bystander rule
exemplifies the importance of the Court's dominant ideology, which in
labor cases reveals tight fists around management obligations to
workers.
65
Strikingly more dynamic was the Court's decision in Reed v. Far-
ley,' 66 which held that the federal writ of habeas corpus cannot be
used to enforce the portion of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(AD) which specifies that a state has no more than 120 days to try an
out-of-state prisoner over whom it has temporary custody. This inter-
pretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the federal habeas
corpus statute, which entities a state prisoner to release if he or she is
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."'1 6 7 Because the IAD is a "law ... of the United States"
161 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
162 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
163 See id. at 2403-07.
164 Id. at 2412 (Souter, J., concurring).
16S See id. at 2417-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (Kennedy, J.) (restricting the application of the National Labor
Relations Act prohibition against unfair labor practices); id. at 1791-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the Court's unsettling of a-longstanding equilibrium in order to distribute benefits to
management).
166 1r4 S. CL 2291 (1994).
167 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
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and the state conceded that it had been violated,168 Orrin Reed should
as a matter of law have been released. Justice Ginsburg's plurality
opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion both sidestepped this
difficulty by invoking precedent which held that habeas relief is only
available for "fundamental" defects resulting in a "miscarriage of jus-
tice. 1 69 But the precedent they cited interpreted the separate habeas
statute applicable only to federal prisoners; hence these Justices were
expanding precedent, rather than just invoking it, and expanding prec-
edent in the teeth of the habeas statute's plain meaning. Indeed, the
majority's application of the precedent to Orrin Reed seems to be con-
trary to the terms and policy of the IAD, which not only directs states
to try temporary prisoners within 120 days of the beginning of cus-
tody, but directs the trying court to dismiss late prosecutions with
prejudice.170 This congressional determination would seem to go a
long way toward meeting the fundamental defect test of federal habeas
corpus precedent.
Reed is a puzzle only if viewed through a rule-of-law lens. It re-
flects the inevitability of dynamic interpretation when statutes yield
unexpected distributional consequences. The Great Writ has had such
consequences, as the numbers and rights of state and federal prisoners
have ballooned far beyond the expectations of the originating Con-
gress. The Rehnquist Court has unusually strong preferences in this
matter because the habeas statute, if literally applied, would, in the
Court's view, flood the federal judiciary with meritless litigation. Con-
sequently, the Court has devised a series of procedural roadblocks to
invocation of the habeas statute by state prisoners. 171 The Court is
able to accomplish this lawmaking feat in part because the habeas
statutes applicable to both state and federal prisoners are generally
worded laws that the Court and Congress have considered to be an
effective delegation to the Court to create statutory common law (simi-
lar to FELA). Moreover, the Court's substantive and institutional
preferences regarding habeas parallel Congress's preferences. Indeed,
168 Reed, 114 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 2297-2300 (Ginsburg, J., for the plurality); see id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment). In Reed, Justices Ginsburg and Scalia both relied on Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
170 See i8 U.S.C. app. § 2, at 703 (i988) (consolidating Articles IV(c) and V(c) of the TAD).
171 See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. CL 2364, 2372 (1994) (Scalia, J.); Caspari v. Bohlen,
114 S. CL 948, 953 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (applying the habeas restriction created in Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); cf. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1738-39 (1994) (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (rejecting right to collateral challenge of previous state convictions when used to enhance
federal sentence under Armed Career Criminal Act). But cf. Burden v. Zant, 114 S. Ct. 654, 6S5
(1994) (per curiam) (reversing a denial of habeas petition). See generally Barry Friedman, Habeas
and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv. 797, 799-802, 82o-26 (1992) (arguing that the Court has acted
with imprudent hubris in silencing lower federal habeas courts).
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the Court's steady restriction of the habeas remedy has accompanied
congressional efforts to accomplish the same goal by statute. 72
Consider, finally, the Court's attitude toward "subsequent legisla-
tive history." Such history is a potentially useful signal of congres-
sional attitudes toward ongoing statutory implementation, and the
Court has long considered such signals when it interprets statutes. 173
The Rehnquist Court regularly inveighs against such evidence as the
most unreliable of signals; in Ratzlaf, for example, the majority refused
to credit a subsequent committee report commenting on the anti-struc-
turing offense in connection with a predecessor bill to an anti-launder-
ing act of I992.174 Yet the committee report suggested that Congress,
in adopting the subsequent statute, was consciously relying on the
then-unanimous interpretation of the anti-structuring law as demand-
ing only proof "that the defendant knew of the ... reporting require-
ment" but not proof "that the defendant knew that structuring itself
had been made illegal." 175  This was in fact a relevant signal from
Congress, and deepens the mystery of Ratzlaf. The contrast with Reed
v. Farley and other recent habeas decisions is striking. The Court is
aware of Congress's rightward drift on prisoner access to habeas
corpus. Although the Court will not cite such "evidence" in an opin-
ion, its decisions have moved in lockstep with Congress's evolving at-
titude toward habeas corpus. 176 Just as subsequent legislative history
is a particularly manipulable congressional signal, so the Court's
stated doctrine on this subject cannot be taken at face value.
3. Ground Rules: The Canons of Construction as an Interpretive
Regime. - The canons of statutory construction are a homely body of
rules and presumptions of statutory meaning. Karl Llewellyn's classic
critique argued that the canons do not constrain judicial decisionmak-
172 In i9go, the House Judiciary Committee inserted liberalizing habeas corpus provisions
(overriding conservative Supreme Court decisions) into the omnibus crime bill of that year, H.R.
REP. No. 68i, ioist Cong., 2d Sess., pt. i, at 123-35 (i99o), but the House passed a very con-
servative habeas title, which actually would have cut back on the Great Writ more than the
Court had done as of 19go. See 136 CONG. REC. H8,876-82 (daily ed. Oct. 4, I9go). The House
conferees killed the habeas title altogether. In 1993, the habeas reform title of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee's omnibus crime bill sought to revise the Supreme Court's rules modestly. See S.
607, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (i993) (codifying a slightly more liberal version of Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). As in 199o, the habeas title was dropped in the final bill.
173 See James J. Brudney, Legislative History Treatment of Judicial Decisions - Idle Chatter
or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enact-
ment Legislative Signals, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 76-79 (Winter 1994) (special issue).
174 Ratzlaf, 114 S. CL at 662 n.i8.
175 H.R REP. No. 28, Io2d Cong., ist Sess., pt. I, at 45 (iggi) (citing United States v. Hoy-
land, 903 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 19go), one of the cases overruled by Ratzlaf). See generally Brud-
ney, supra note 173 (providing a roadmap of judicial use of legislative signals).
176 For example, in i9gi, the liberal Judiciary Committee reported a moderate habeas title,
which would have curtailed Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., ist
Sess. tit. XI (ig9i). Within months, the Supreme Court overruled Fay in Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (I99i).
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ing, because "there are two opposing canons on almost every point" of
statutory interpretation; he demonstrated his thesis by compiling a list
showing every canon to have a counter-canon. 177 Law as equilibrium,
however, is not as much concerned with constraining judges as with
understanding how institutions coordinate their activities and dis-
tribute benefits in the legal system. Under this conception of law, the
canons of statutory construction can be understood as part of what
John Ferejohn has called an "interpretive regime."'1 78
An interpretive regime is a system of background norms and con-
ventions against which the Court will read statutes. An interpretive
regime tells lower court judges, agencies, and citizens how strings of
words in statutes will be read, what presumptions will be entertained
as to statutes's scope and meaning, and what auxiliary materials might
be consulted to resolve ambiguities. Interpretive regimes serve both
rule-of-law and coordination purposes. The integrity of an interpretive
regime provides some degree of insulation against judicial arbitrari-
ness; by rendering statutory interpretation more predictable, regular,
and coherent, interpretive regimes can contribute to the rule of law.
This goal is subject to Llewellyn's criticism, but the Supreme Court is
itself aware of that criticism and can therefore be expected to counter-
act its force. For example, Justice Stevens's opinion in Landgraf ad-
verted to Llewellyn and acknowledged two "seemingly contradictory
statements found in [the Court's] decisions concerning the effect of in-
tervening changes in the law."17 9 But the remainder of his opinion
sought to reconcile those statements and resolved whatever contradic-
tions there had been in favor of a strong presumption against the ap-
plication of statutes to nonlitigation events completed before the
statute's enactment. 8 0 For issues of statutory retroactivity, Landgraf
greatly diminishes the force of Llewellyn's criticism.
An interpretive regime also serves institutional coordination func-
tions. One goal of such a regime, and of the canons, is to lower the
costs of drafting statutes. Drafting complete statutes that cover all
conceivable contingencies is impracticable because of staff limitations
and the inability of legislators to achieve consensus on all issues. This
creates the possibility of numerous statutory ambiguities that might
177 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (ig5o); see id. at 401-06.
178 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of Law, in
THE RULE OF LAW 265, 267 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (Nomos XXXVI); see Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 19go WIs. L. REv. 1179, 1224-25.
179 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 1x4 S. CL r483, 1496 (x994); see also id. at 1496 n.a6 (noting
that Llewellyn also identified competing canons regarding retroactive application of statutes).
180 See id. at 1496-iSo5, 1497 n.18 (relying on LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW
(1964), and taking an approach similar to that in HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 628).
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generate large costs.'"' The Court can perform a valuable coordinat-
ing function by generating "off-the-rack," gap-filling rules that are ac-
cessible ex ante to the drafters. Knowing the interpretive regime into
which statutes will be developed over time, the players in the legisla-
tive bargaining process will be better able to predict what effects dif-
ferent statutory language will have. This will permit them to leave
much unsaid in the statute itself, which will permit more statutes to
be enacted and at a cheaper overall cost. This goal is one that the
Rehnquist Court has been consciously pursuing, 18 2 and the Court has
since 1986 developed an elaborate landscape of rules and presumptions
that ought to be helpful to an attentive Congress. Lest there be any
doubt on this score, we attach as an Appendix to this Foreword the
regime of rules and presumptions of statutory interpretation that are
ascertainable in the Court's opinions from the 1986 Term through the
1993 Term.
The usefulness of the canons under the foregoing theory does not
depend upon the Court's choosing the "best" canons for each proposi-
tion. Instead, the canons may be understood as conventions, similar to
driving a car on the right-hand side of the road; often it is not as
important to choose the best convention as it is to choose one conven-
tion, and stick to it. This point is most applicable to the canons relat-
ing to grammar, word choice, and inference from different syntactical
configurations. The Court has been criticized for invoking the canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression or inclusion of one
thing implies the exclusion of others) on the ground that it is unrealis-
tic.1 8 3 Even if this criticism is correct, the canon remains valuable if it
is usually respected, as it is by the current Court.'8 4 This is a signal to
legislative drafters, who thereby know ex ante that, if they want to
make lists in their statutes, the lists should be exhaustive.
While any systematic collection of canons might be an efficient co-
ordinating device, different collections may not be equivalent. The use
of one set of canons rather than another may affect the distribution of
181 On the substantial costs of statutory ambiguity, consult Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the
Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee,
29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 126-3o (1992).
182 "What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a back-
ground of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
183 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
So U. Cm. L. REV. 800, 813 (1983).
184 The Court frequently relies on arguments by negative implication (expressio unius types of
argumentation). See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2054 (994) (Scalia, J.);
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1751 (1994) (Blackmun, J.); Custis v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (994) (Rehnquist, CJ.); City of Chicago v. Environmental
Defense Fund, Hi4 S. Ct. 1588, 1592 4994) (Scalia, J.); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114
S. Ct. 1439, 1448-50 (1994) (Kennedy, J.); Department of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 114 S. Ct. 843,
849-50 (1994) (Kennedy, J.).
1994]
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 67 1994-1995
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
benefits within the legislative bargaining process. This feature is most
apparent in the canons that represent presumptions in favor of sub-
stantive policies. One canon that was prominent this Term was the
rule against shifting counsel fees in litigation. 185 This canon affects the
enforcement of statutes by making it harder for Congress to stimulate
enforcement through private attorneys general. Landgrafs choice of a
general presumption against statutory retroactivity similarly makes it
systematically harder for Congress to reach actions occurring before
statutory enactments, or even to negate Supreme Court opinions that
have unsettled congressional expectations (as in Rivers).
The Supreme Court's authority to create interpretive regimes hav-
ing distributional effects illustrates the substantial lawmaking author-
ity the Court has under a conception of law as equilibrium. Although
Congress can meet the requirements of the canons by drafting statutes
to rebut their presumptions or rules, Congress has fewer options to
negate the Court's power to shape the interpretive regime under which
the country operates. 18 6 Nonetheless, Congress is fairly acquiescent in
this arrangement, based upon the following implicit bargain. The ca-
nons that have the greatest distributive effect tend to be those that are
inspired by constitutional values - but constitutional values that the
Court rarely enforces through judicial review.18 7 For example, the
nonretroactivity of new legal obligations is a value sprinkled through-
out the Constitution, but the Court rarely strikes down federal statutes
for violating this principle.' 88 Instead, the Court presumes against
such retroactivity in civil cases like Landgraf. The constitutionally
based canons (see the Appendix for a listing) are vehicles for the Court
to enforce values it considers important, but in a manner that does not
challenge the ultimate power of a coordinate branch of government.
A related theme is the usefulness of the canons as signalling de-
vices in the Court-created interpretive regime. Virtually all of the tex-
tual and referential canons are "presumptions" of meaning; they are
merely a factor to be considered, or a tiebreaker in close cases. Some
of the substantive canons, however, have now been developed as more
powerful "clear statement rules," which are presumptions that can only
be rebutted by clear statements in the statutory text. The Court's
choice to articulate a canon as a clear statement rule rather than as a
185 See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. ig6o, z965 (x994) (Stevens, J.);
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033 ('994) (Rehnquist, CJ.).
186 Of course, Congress may enact certain rules of construction applicable to all federal stat-
utes. See i U.S.C. §§ i-6 (1988).
187 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 629-32 (1992).
188 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2o8, 2021-23 (1994) (Blackmun, J.) (pointing
out that retroactive tax legislation has survived numerous due process challenges); cf. Powell v.
Nevada, 114 S. Ct. 1280, 1283 (i994) (Ginsburg, J.) (finding that the Court's constitutional prece-
dents regarding criminal prosecutions apply retroactively).
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presumption not only imposes a higher burden on those seeking to
trump the canon, but signals the intensity of the Court's prefer-
ences.' 8 9 The Court's choice in Landgraf to characterize the rule
against statutory retroactivity as a "presumption" that could be rebut-
ted by legislative history as well as statutory text was a signal of the
Court's views about the importance of the constitutional nonretroac-
tivity value. Three concurring Justices advocated a clear statement
rule, which reflected more intense preferences for nonretroactivity. 190
The most striking signal the Court sent last Term was that gun-
toting and transaction-structuring defendants cannot be convicted of
crimes without proof of unusually specific intent to commit those
crimes. The rule of lenity - the canon that saw the most action this
Term' 9' - requires that, if the state seeks to penalize people, statutory
ambiguities be resolved in favor of defendants. Ratzlaf is best read as
a rule of lenity case; if the 197o Act as amended were ambiguous,
Waldemar and Loretta Ratzlaf should perhaps go free. We still find
this decision hard to explain under traditional formalist or even realist
criteria, and we feel the same way about Staples v. United States,
19
2
which overturned a conviction for unlawful possession of a machine
gun because the government did not prove that the defendant had
specific knowledge that the weapon was in fact fully capable of firing
automatically.
Why is a Court that is ordinarily oriented toward law and order
showing such solicitude for these criminal defendants? In our judg-
ment, these decisions are signals of the Court's extreme displeasure
189 Compare Hagen v. Utah, "14 S. Ct 958, 965 (I994) (O'Connor, J.) (articulating the pre-
sumption that ambiguities in statutes and treaties affecting Indians will be resolved in their favor)
with id. at 971 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Indians should win, based upon the
requirement that the statutory text contain "clear and unequivocal evidence" before Indians can
be deprived of rights).
190 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1522 ('994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.).
191 Defendants were sprung by the rule of lenity in Ratzlaf, as well as in other cases. See
Staples v. United States, 114 S. CL 1793, 18o4 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (machine gun possession);
United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (criminal sentence). De-
fendants got their property back in James Daniel Good. See also McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct.
2568, 2572-73 (I994) (Blackmun, J.) (interpreting a federal statute to require counsel for capital
defendants who are preparing habeas petitions); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 14 S. Ct. 2331,
234o-41 (1994) (Stevens, J.) (striking down a state law precluding judicial review of punitive dam-
age awards). The Court found a clear statement of criminal liability, and hence declined to apply
the rule of lenity, in a number of cases. See Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
1747, 175o-54 (1994) (Blackmun, J.) (drug paraphernalia); Custis v. United States, H14 S. CL 1732,
r735-36 (x994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (sentence enhancement); Beecham v. United States, xr4 S. Ct.
166'9, 1672 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (firearms); see also Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419,
2424-25 (r994) (Thomas, J.) (disregarding claim that instructions to jury under insanity defense
statute must inform jurors of the involuntary commitment consequences); United States v. Alva-
rez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599, 1603-04 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (upholding the admissibility of a custo-
dial statement).
192 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994) (Thomas, J.).
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with Congress on a range of interrelated issues. First, for the Court
at least, the crimes in these cases are in the nature of malum prohib-
itum instead of malum in se and hence do not justify any form of
criminal strict liability. 9 3 Justice Ginsburg admonished the govern-
ment in Ratzlaf that "currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious,"
because strategic small-dose deposits might be made by a person "fear-
ful that the bank's reports would increase the likelihood of burglary
[!], or in an endeavor to keep a former spouse unaware of his wealth
[!!] or "'in order to avoid the impact of some regulation or tax
[!!!]. '"" 94 Justice Thomas waxed similarly in Staples to reject the gov-
ernment's view that guns are "dangerous items." Thus, "despite their
potential for harm, guns generally can be owned in perfect innocence,"
apparently including the "readily convertible semiautomatic" that Har-
old E. Staples, III was charged with possessing. 95 Mr. Staples, meet
the Ratzlafs.
More important are two other values that coalesce around the
ever-expanding nationalization of crime: federalism and a concern
about the business of the federal judiciary. From the standpoint of
political theory, we should expect the Court to react with hostility
when Congress loads up the dockets of the already-swamped federal
courts with criminal cases, which must receive priority scheduling, es-
pecially when the crimes have no special national significance or regu-
latory interest.'9 6 When this is coupled with the Court's general anti-
regulatory, libertarian bent and its respect for the integrity of state
193 See J. WILLARD HuRsT, DEALING WITH STATUTES 64-65 (1982) (arguing that rule of lenity
concerns are greatest for crimes that are malum prohibitum).
194 Ratzlaf, 114 S. CL at 66o-6i (citations omitted).
195 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at i8oo & n.6. Justice Thomas essentially contrasted ownership of bad
guns, which (like hand grenades) are regulable as a public welfare crime, United States v. Freed,
401 U.S. 6or, 6o7-io (197), with good guns, which (like automobiles) are unregulable except
upon a showing of very specific intent. See Staples, 114 S. CL at 1800-02.
196 The federal judiciary, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, has publicly expressed its opposi-
tion to the federalization of crime on the following grounds:
[E]xpansion of federal jurisdiction would be inconsistent with long-accepted concepts of
federalism, and would ignore the boundaries between appropriate state and federal action.
[ . .[I]t will [also] swamp the federal courts with routine cases that states are better
equipped to handle, and will weaken the ability of the federal courts effectively to deal
with difficult criminal cases that present uniquely federal issues.
, -* [Flederal courts, overburdened by criminal cases, will be unable to carry out their
vital responsibilities to provide timely forums for civil cases.
Federalization of State Prosecutions: Position of the Judicial Conference of the United States, en-
closed in Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist, Presiding Officer of the Judicial Conference, to
Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, in 140 CONG. REC. S6o9o
(daily ed. May 1g, 1994); see also William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of
the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. x, 6-7 ("Most federal judges have serious concerns about
the numbers and types of crimes now being funnelled into the federal courts."); Mary Deibel,
Justices Warn Against "Police Courts," MEMPIS CoaM. APPEAL, March 4, 1994, at A4 (stating
that, while presenting the Supreme Court's budget to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Jus-
tices Kennedy and Souter warned of serious consequences for the federal court system when
pressed for their views on the federalization of crime).
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authority against congressional regulation, we can imagine a Court op-
erating on the assumptions that conduct that is (to the Court) merely
malum prohibitum rather than malum in se is presumptively lawful
and should be subject only to the general state police power unless
there is an overriding national interest. If Congress wishes to federal-
ize such crimes, it has the power to do so, but the Court may interpret
the congressional command grudgingly, giving it only the scope com-
pelled by a narrow parsing of its four corners.
In our judgment, the narrow statutory readings of Staples and
Ratzlaf are difficult to square with the rule-of-law value in following
statutory text, are inconsistent with Congress's recent policy judgments
expanding the reach of the federal criminal code, and dishonor rela-
tively recent congressional agreements. Why, then, would not the
Court have feared an override and come out the other way? In this
area, the Court and the Congress are at loggerheads, and the Court
may feel that it must communicate its concern to Congress clearly,
come what may. Although ordinarily the Court might be expected to
assist the current Congress by not requiring that it return to a statu-
tory area and fix small mistakes, in this area the Court is an active
opponent of Congress and seems to be throwing up what roadblocks it
can. In addition, because there are few interest groups to derail feel-
good, do-something federal crime bills, the Court may sense that it
alone is left to confront Congress. These instincts may well represent
good policy, but they more clearly represent a vision of law as institu-
tional equilibrium. Whatever is driving these decisions, it is not values
traditionally associated with the rule of law.
C. The Role of Agencies in Statutory Interpretation
Our thesis provides an interesting way to understand the relation-
ship of the Supreme Court to independent and executive agencies.
Law as equilibrium suggests a strategic explanation for the rule exem-
plified by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 197 Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court set out a framework by
which the Court would ordinarily defer to agency interpretations of
the statutes they were charged with enforcing, unless Congress had
clearly spoken on the issue. This rule of deference was justified on
separation of powers grounds: an agency is more accountable to the
democratic process than the Court is.198 We can augment the Court's
justification by emphasizing that agencies are better informed, more
efficient barometers of the political equilibrium than the Court is. Be-
cause of their place in governance, agencies are both knowledgeable
197 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
198 See id. at 864-66.
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about and responsive to presidential and congressional preferences. 199
Agencies are also the first government organ to address most interpre-
tive issues, and when they do so they are usually able to anticipate the
responses of other national institutions accurately enough to avoid
overrides. Knowing that an agency is likely to have much better infor-
mation than the Court does, the Court will rationally defer to the
agency on most issues. Not deferring carries with it an increased risk
of a political rebuke.
On the other hand, Chevron does not assure deference, and the
1993 Term was not a particularly deferential Term. By a liberal count,
federal agency positions prevailed in thirteen of twenty-one civil
cases. 20 0 This batting average of 62% is lower than the 71% cumula-
tive average agencies had from the 1981 through the 1992 Terms of
the Court.20 1 Some of the most important decisions of the 1993 Term
rejected agency positions, especially those allegedly "overenforcing"
199 Presidents appoint and dismiss executive agency heads and commissioners, and review most
agency regulations. See Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Struc-
ture, 57 LAw & CoTrral',. PROBS. I, 17-,9 (Spring 1994) (special issue). Congress monitors agen-
cies through oversight hearings, bugs them through informal contacts, and pressures or rewards
them through the appropriations process.
200 Agency positions prevailed in a number of cases. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
ii4 S. CL 2381, 2389 (1994) (Kennedy, J.) (HHS); PUD No. i v. Washington Dep't of Ecology,
114 S. Ct. I9OO, 1909-12 (i994) (O'Connor, J.) (EPA); Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1727-28
(i994) (Rehnquist, Cj.) (presidential commission); Security Servs., Inc. v. KMart Corp., 114 S. Ct.
,702, 17o8-io (i994) (Souter, J.) (ICC); United States v. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (i994) (Sou-
ter, J.) (IRS); United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 114 S. CL xoo6,
io6 (1994) (Thomas, J.) (Dep't of Defense); FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, ioo5-o6 (1994)
(Thomas, J.) (FSLIC); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835, 838-40 (1994) (Stevens, J.)
(NLRB); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771, 774-75, 782 (i994) (Blackmun, J.)
(Dep't of Labor); Weiss v. United States, 114 S. CL 752, 760, 763 (994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (Dep't
of Defense); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (i993) (O'Connor, J.) (EEOC). We
also count Landgraf and Rivers, in which the Court followed but did not rely on the EEOC's
interpretation. We are tempted but do not count Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent,
Mich., 114 S. Ct. 855, 859 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (Dep't of Transportation), in which the Court
noted the absence of agency guidance and invited the agency to develop rules.
Agency positions were rejected in a number of cases. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct.
2647, 2663 (1994) (Souter, J.) (Dep't of Justice); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. CL 2251, 2259 (1994) (O'Connor, J.) (Dep't of Labor); MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2231-32 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (FCC);
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2052-53, 2o56 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (FDIC); NLRB v.
Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1785 (994) (Kennedy, J.) (NLRB);
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1594 (994) (Scalia, J.) (EPA);
Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 114 S. CL 1439, 1454-55 (994) (Kennedy, J.)
(SEC); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 529-31
(i993) (Ginsburg, J.) (Dep't of Labor).
201 See Merrill, supra note 143, this. 2 & 3, at 359-60. Merrill appears only to count decisions
where there is a formal "case[] involving deference," id. at tbl. 2, whereas we have looked more
broadly at every agency position outside of the criminal context and have counted cases where the
Court breathes not a word of the agency position in its opinion.
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statutory rules. 20 2 This phenomenon is, in part, a consequence of law-
making structures in a libertarian polity; rules of standing and judicial
review make it much easier for litigants to challenge aggressive agency
regulation (overenforcement) than agency passivity and inaction
(underenforcement).
20 3
Additionally, the decisions rejecting agency interpretations did so
because the interpretations were inconsistent with the statutory text.
The lesson of Chevron, the Court was reminding these agencies and
the Solicitor General's Office, 20 4 is that agencies can interpret statutes
dynamically, so long as their interpretations do not traverse the plain
meaning of the statute, a value that the Supreme Court will enforce
"to the letter.120 5  This is a shrewd move on the part of the Court.
Such decisions reaffirm the Marbury idea that the Court - and not
the Solicitor General or a bunch of agencies - is the ultimate arbiter
of what the "law" is, and preserve opportunities for the Court to
trump agency interpretations it does not like.
As in Ratzlaf, the Court's plain meaning analysis in these cases
was underwhelming. Consider MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
AT&T Co.20 6  Section 203(a) of the Communications Act207 requires
communications common carriers to file schedules of charges and con-
ditions of service with the FCC; section 203(b)(2) permits the FCC to
202 See Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. at 2259 (invalidating the Department of Labor's bur-
den of proof rule in black lung cases); MCI, 114 S. CL at 2233 (holding that the FCC's power to
"modify" statutory requirements does not allow the agency to dispose of filing requirements alto-
gether); O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2o55-56 (rejecting the FDIC's view that the savings and loan
bailout statute supplants state law as the standard of care applicable to defendants); Health Care,
114 S. Ct. at i785 (voiding the NLRB's longstanding test for determining when nurses are "super-
visors" and hence exempt from the National Labor Relations Act); and Central Bank, 114 S. Ct.
at 1448 (rejecting the SEC's view that alders and abettors are covered by the anti-fraud provision
of the securities law). On the distinction between "under-" and "overenforcing" a statute, see Earl
M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement,
Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768 ('99').
203 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (finding that non-
enforcement decisions are generally unreviewable); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752-753 (1984)
(O'Connor, J.) (highlighting the problem of having standing to challenge agency nonenforcement:
who can show actual injury?).
204 The Solicitor General lost about half of the 6i cases in which the government filed a brief;
the Reagan Administration's Office, by contrast, won about two-thirds of its cases. We attribute
the Solicitor General's poor showing, in part, to the Republican Court's "hazing" a new Demo-
cratic administration. Cf. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 26, at 313 (finding that ideology is the
primary basis for the Court's historical support of the Solicitor General). Nonetheless, the Solici-
tor General can usually do better than a .Soo batting average, even under a hostile Court. Some
advice for the Office: buy more dictionaries (Webster's Third took a shot in MCI, 114 S. Ct. at
2229-3o), and hire some good linguists. (Hint: Cunningham, Levi, Green and Kaplan (a law pro-
fessor and three linguists), cited above in note 46, accurately predicted Court decisions in the
three cases they analyzed for the 1993 Term. See id. at x562 & n.2.)
205 KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (I988) (Kennedy, J.); see also Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DuKE LJ. SI1i, 515.
206 114 S. Ct. 2223 (i994) (Scalia, 3.).
207 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988).
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"modify any requirement made by or under the authority of this sec-
tion." Responding to the perceived need for more competition in the
long distance telephone market, the FCC between i98o and 1992 is-
sued a series of orders that ultimately allowed nondominant (non-
AT&T) companies to avoid the expensive process of filing and amend-
ing tariff schedules. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's policy
violates the plain meaning of section 203(b)(2).208 The FCC argued
that its authority to modify any requirement of section 203 allows it,
in appropriate circumstances, to exempt companies from the filing re-
quirements. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that the au-
thority to modify means only "to change moderately or in minor
fashion," a standard dictionary definition of "modify." 20 9 Because the
FCC's orders worked a "fundamental" rather than "minor" change in
section 203's requirements, it was not a permissible modification.
2 10
Justice Scalia's opinion in MCI is more dogmatic than cogent. The
opinion conceded that one definition of "modify" in Webster's Third is
"to make a basic or important change in," but dismissed this use as
colloquial and idiosyncratic to that dictionary.2 11 As Justice Stevens
argued in dissent, Justice Scalia was wrong. The distinguished Oxford
English Dictionary refers to an exemption of whole categories from a
regulatory regime as an example of "modify. '212 Most on point, the
1933 edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published the year before the
Communications Act was passed, defined the term as "an alteration
which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of
them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter
208 See MCI, 114 S. Ct. at 2231-33.
209 See id. at 2229.
210 See id. at 2230-32.
211 Id. at 2229-30 & nn.2-3 (explaining the Court's rejection of the definition in WEBSTER'S
TmRD NE W INTERNATiONAL DICTIONARY 1452 (2976) and related Merriam-Webster products).
Justice Scalia belittled Webster's Third for its colloquial usages, but the Court itself relies on that
dictionary more than any other. See, e.g., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, x14 S. Ct. 2239, 2245
(1994) (using the maligned dictionary's definition of the word "or" in a decision handed down
three days after the Court's ruling in MCI); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory
Interpretation, o7 HARV. L. REV. 2437, 1439 n.12 (1994) (stating that Webster's Third has been
the Court's most frequently cited dictionary over the five Terms from 1988-1992). Before the
1993 Term, Justice Scalia regularly credited Webster's Third. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Reve-
nue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S. Ct. 2447, 2453, 2455 (1992); State v. Hodari D., 499 U.s.
62I, 624 (199'). Moreover, the Court (including Justice Scalia) has traditionally followed a word's
"ordinary" meaning rather than its "technical" meaning. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, N14 S.
Ct. I147, 1,55-57 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (insisting upon a colloquial meaning of "bias or prejudice,"
thereby importing an unstated invidiousness requirement into statute).
212 The Oxford English Dictionary provides this illustration from 16io: "For so Mariana modi-
fies his Doctrine, that the Prince should not execute any Clergy man, though hee deser[v]e it."
See MCI, 114 S. CL at 2237 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
952 (2d ed. 1989)).
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intact.1213 If section 203 is viewed "as part of a statute whose aim is
to constrain monopoly power, the Commission's decision to exempt
nondominant carriers is a rational and 'measured' adjustment to novel
circumstances. 
2 14
It is hard to view the nondeference decisions as simply the Court's
articulation of a text-based rule of law. It is easier to understand the
decisions as reflecting the same economic libertarian, anti-regulatory
philosophy revealed in the rule of lenity, takings, and dormant com-
merce clause cases. The current Court valorizes the free market and
gives the benefit of the doubt to businesses and banks that have made
it in that market.215 It is not willing (or able) to deny Congress the
authority to regulate the market, but the Court can make such regula-
tion more difficult by reading Congress's work product narrowly. The
Court's literalist approach curtails agency activism, but without chal-
lenging Congress's authority in any direct way. Indeed, the textualist
opinions openly invite legislative revision.
Another explanation for the nondeference cases is suggested by
Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer.216 Cohen and Spitzer start with
the neglected point that the Supreme Court presides over the entire
federal court system and depends on lower courts to carry out any
agenda the Court might have.217 Accordingly, the Court administers
rewards and punishments (affirmances and reversals) to lower courts,
and these are signals as to how much more or less deferential lower
courts should be to agencies. Thus, what is important each Term is
not just the Court's willingness to defer to agencies, but also whether
the Court is affirming or reversing lower courts. Cohen and Spitzer
predict that the current Court, populated by Reagan-era Justices and
presiding over circuit courts similarly peopled, will early in the Clinton
Administration reward lower courts that are tough on agencies, even
when the policies being invalidated predate the Clinton period.218 The
213 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (3d ed. 1933). See generally Note, supra note 2ii, at
1447-48 (arguing that the Court has been inconsistent in its use of dictionaries and suggesting
that the Court has engaged in dictionary shopping).
214 MCI, 114 S. CL at 2237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215 The winners-over-losers in the main nondeference cases listed above were coal operators
over black lung victims (Greenwich Collieries); AT&T over MCI (MCI); aiders and abettors to
alleged S&L crooks over federal regulators (O'Melveny); hospitals over nurses (Health Care); and
banks over defrauded investors (Central Bank).
216 Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65 (Spring 1994) (special issue).
217 See id. at 71-72; cf. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 1093, 1135 (r987) (concluding that the Court's relationship with the lower federal tribu-
nals affects its "approach to statutory and administrative matters").
218 See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 216, at zo8-o9; cf ToNY KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMERICA:
MiLLENNiUM APPROACHES 63 (1992) (quoting the character Martin Heller, who boasts that fed-
eral judges appointed in the r98os are Reagan "land mines" that will detonate periodically).
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1993 Term provides some evidence to support their hypothesis, be-
cause in the nondeference cases the Court was affirming (and therefore
rewarding) lower courts that had reversed agencies.
2 19
Ill. EQUILIBRIUM'S NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC LAW
Part I1 provides evidence for our descriptive thesis, that any expla-
nation of the Court's decisionmaking must consider the Court's strate-
gic behavior in pursuit of institutional and other goals. A key legal
process assumption apparent from the foregoing description is the
Court's typical desire to avoid open conflict with the political
branches, either by deferring to them or by obscuring conflicts under
cover of textualist technique or clear statement rules. In this Part we
subject this assumption to a normative critique drawn from a more
subtle understanding of law as equilibrium.
The Court's avoidance of open conflict with the political branches
may undermine the long-term interests of the Court itself in three dif-
ferent contexts. First, in pure statutory interpretation cases, the cur-
rent Court tends to mask its disagreements with Congress under the
aegis of textualist analysis. Part II expressed skepticism about the
Court's ability to write persuasive textualist opinions. This Part fur-
ther maintains that the Court's newfound textualism only exacerbates
the normative tension between democracy and the rule of law, and
that a more pragmatic approach better serves both democratic and
rule-of-law values. Second, in statutory interpretation cases with con-
stitutional issues in the background, the Court's capricious invention
and invocation of super-strong clear statement rules avoids immediate
constitutional conflict at the price of candid ventilation of constitu-
tional concerns and sacrifices the reliability of the canonical interpre-
tive regime constructed by the Court. Third, in constitutional cases,
the Court is too deferential to national political equilibria that are in-
consistent with the constitutional traditions the Court is charged with
enforcing. By deferring, the Court slights its unique institutional role
of protecting basic constitutional values.
Our general point is that a focus on short-term conflict avoidance
undermines the Court's longer-term institutional position and influ-
ence. For the Court to play a constructive role, it must show greater
restraint in statutory cases, in which the Court is currently most ac-
219 In five of the eight nondeference cases, the Court was affirming lower courts; in two the
Court was reversing lower courts; one case involved elements of both (De Grandy). Less support-
ive of the Cohen-Spitzer thesis were our aggregate findings, however. Of the 2o agency cases in
which the Court flatly affirmed or reversed lower courts (i.e., leaving out De Grandy), the Court
granted certiorari in io cases in which judges were reversing agencies and 1o cases in which
judges were affirming agencies. In the former category, the Court affirmed lower courts in five
cases and reversed in five cases; this is not a signal that would encourage lower courts to reverse
agencies. In the latter category, the Court affirmed lower courts in eight cases and reversed in
only two; this is a signal for lower courts to defer.
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tivist. Our judgment is that the current Court is exploiting its law-
making opportunities too often in statutory cases such as Ratzlaf and
MCI, and should either offer substantive defenses of its activism or
should be more cooperative. In other words, the Court should either
"put up" or "shut up" in statutory cases. On the other hand, the Court
is too timid in reviewing national policies on constitutional grounds,
especially where core values of freedom and citizenship are involved
and the political branches have not adequately addressed or balanced
these values. We conclude this Foreword with an example of how the
Court can contribute to tomorrow's equilibrium by destabilizing to-
day's squalid consensus.
A. Text versus Practice
The larger debate embedded within the Court's most contentious
statutory cases this Term involves the meaning of the rule of law in a
democracy. There is a potential tension between democratic values
and rule-of-law values in our system. The former promote responsive-
ness to changing political preferences, while the latter promote stabil-
ity or predictability of rights and obligations.
Our approach has the normative advantage of reconciling demo-
cratic values with the rule of law. The process we have described is a
dialectical one, and the dialogue is potentially integrative; the back-
and-forth process of anticipated responses, signalling, and implicit bar-
gains is a way by which democratically elected decisionmakers inter-
nalize values of predictability and stability and rule-of-law
decisionmakers internalize values of popular accountability. Law's
equilibrium, however, suggests a difficulty in perfectly achieving this
reconciliation, for the Court is tempted to read its substantive views
into statutes when inertia or an important political player protects the
Court from a statutory override.
In contrast, the new, tougher version of textualism advocated by
Justices Scalia and Thomas exacerbates the tension between democ-
racy and the rule of law and ultimately serves as a cover for the injec-
tion of conservative values into statutes. Insisting that statutory
interpretation ignore legislative history and adhering to dictionaries at
the expense of common sense, the new textualism is insensitive to the
expectations of elected representatives. 22 0 Maintaining that clear statu-
tory texts can trump longstanding practice and taking a dogmatic and
often bizarre view of what is clear, the new textualism sacrifices the
security and predictability associated with the rule of law. An inter-
220 Equally insensitive to Congress's expectations is the new textualism's view that unreason-
able implications of clear statutes are best corrected by Congress through legislation rather than
by the Court through interpretation. This view ignores Congress's limited legislative agenda,
which is a primary reason courts and agencies are necessary in the first place. See Brudney,
supra note 173.
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pretive philosophy that slights both democracy and rule of law, and
results in odd applications (MCI, Ratzlaf, Reed), is not attractive. Nor
has this philosophy seduced the Court. Only Justice Thomas shares
Justice Scalia's zeal for text, the whole text, and nothing but the
text.2
2 1
In Holder and De Grandy, Justice Thomas mounted an analytically
powerful attack on a generation's worth of Voting Rights Act jurispru-
dence.222 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, pro-
vides that "En]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote"
because of race.2 23 Justice Thomas argued that the "ordinary mean-
ing" of this text reaches only practices that affect minority citizens'
access to the ballot, but conceded that the Court has extended the text
to reach broader challenges to electoral configurations that allegedly
result in racial vote dilution. Relying on committee reports accompa-
nying the 1982 amendments, the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles224 had
held that the Act contemplates challenges against multimember dis-
tricts. Starting with a textualist analysis that was at least as cogent as
that invoked in Ratzlaf and MCI, Justice Thomas, joined only by Jus-
tice Scalia, urged the Court to overrule Gingles.225 In Holder, four
Justices (Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg) explicitly defended the
Court's vote-diluting approach to voting rights as a longstanding equi-
librium that had been repeatedly ratified by congressional reenact-
ments of the Voting Rights Act,226 and in De Grandy, seven Justices
essentially rejected the approach of Justices Thomas and Scalia.
227
We agree with the approach taken by the four Justices in Holder.
In statutory interpretation cases, absent a strong substantive justifica-
tion, the Court should be unwilling to disturb a stable equilibrium,
especially one that was recently reinstated by Congress in response to
221 Some cases from prior Terms illustrate this proposition. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113
S. Ct. 1562, 1566 n.X2 (1993) (illustrating that all but Justices Scalia and Thomas reject the new
textualist approach to legislative history); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 5o U.S. 597, 6x
n.4 (iggi) (indicating that all other Justices except Justice Scalia himself give some weight to
legislative history).
222 See Holder, 114 S. CL at 2591-26i9 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); De Grandy,
114 S. CL at 2667 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
223 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
224 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
225 See Holder, 114 S. CL at 2618-i9.
226 See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2626-30 (separate opinion of Stevens, J.).
227 See De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2655-63 (Souter, J., for six Justices) (assessing the merits of
minority voters' vote dilution claims against the State of Florida's reapportionment plan); id. at
2664-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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a temporary displacement of that equilibrium.2 28  Furthermore, the
Court should not disturb a widely shared understanding that it has
confirmed in its own precedents. This recalls a descriptive lesson of
our model: considerations of stare decisis are strongest when the ques-
tionable precedent is one that is consistent with current legal and so-
cial values;229 conversely, stare decisis will not save a precedent that is
clearly out-of-sync with current political winds.
23 0
Although the new textualism did not prevail in the Voting Rights
Act cases, a narrow majority of the Court did rely on its tenets to
disrupt a settled equilibrium in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. 2 3 1 Section io(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 makes it unlawful "for any person, directly or indi-
rectly," to employ "any manipulative or deceptive device" in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 2 32 The Court held
that section io(b) does not impose a duty upon people who aid or abet
others in committing securities fraud. Justice Kennedy's opinion ar-
gued directly from the text of section io(b), which does not specifically
penalize aiding and abetting, and by negative implication from Con-
gress's willingness explicitly to impose such liability in other regulatory
statutes.2 33 He also maintained that imposing such liability would be
inconsistent with the expectations of Congress in 1934 and with the
Court's elaboration of the statutory policy of requiring plaintiffs to al-
lege that they have relied on the defendant's fraud.2 34 Justice Ken-
228 The Voting Rights Act Amendments in 1982 specifically overrode City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 66 (ig8o), which had interpreted the Act to require a discriminatory purpose in vote
dilution cases and had repudiated a lower court consensus that vote dilution claims were not
subject to a strict showing of discriminatory intent. See Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2627 & n.4 (sepa-
rate opinion of Stevens, J.). The Court's refusal to displace this stable equilibrium a second time
did not mean that the Court was inclined to read the statute generously, however. In Holder, it
refused to expand the Voting Rights Act to regulate the size of an electoral body. See Holder, II4
S. Ct. at 2588.
229 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 274 (i989) (citing BENJAMIN N. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921), quoted in Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. x6o, i9i (1976)); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 28o8-12 (1992) (joint
opinion) (finding that the values of liberty and autonomy still strongly support the decision of Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. ii3 (I973)).
230 The Rehnquist Court has overruled a boatload of habeas corpus precedents, reflecting a
new but stable Court-Congress equilibrium that disapproves of liberal prisoner access to the Great
Writ. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1717 (1992) (White, J.); Coleman v.
Thompson, 5o U.S. 722, 750 (iggi) (O'Connor, J.) (finally killing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), after years of bleeding the precedent); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-96 (i9gi)
(Kennedy, J.). See also pp. 45-46 (discussing the Court's narrowing of the procedural protections
of criminal defendants).
231 114 S. Ct. 1439 (i994).
232 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § xo(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
233 See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446-48; cf. Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 202, 42
Stat. i61 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 192(g) (1988)) (imposing liability explicitly on those
who "aid or abet").
234 See Central Bank, 114 S. CL at 1448-5o.
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nedy made a fine text-based case, but for a statement of law that no
party in the case had asked the Court to adopt in the certiorari
papers.
235
In dissent, Justice Stevens wrote for the same four Justices who
responded to Justice Thomas in Holder.236 Like the parties in Central
Bank, Justice Stevens thought that a stable equilibrium had formed on
this issue. In hundreds of cases, the SEC and every federal court of
appeals to consider the issue had concluded that aiders and abettors
are subject to liability under section io(b), based upon statutory policy
and general principles of tort law.237 Congress was specifically aware
of those decisions, and the relevant committees had signalled approval
of them.238 Justice Stevens worked from the precept, long established
in the Court's precedents, that a "'settled construction of an important
federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so
decides." 2
39
We do not read Central Bank simply as an opinion in which text
trumps practice, for Justice Kennedy also relied on substantive reasons
for reading aiding and abetting out of section io(b).240 A broad view
of section io(b) would create legal exposure for banks, attorneys, and
accountants assisting in securities offerings.241 This would, he
surmised from a single law review article, have vast distributive conse-
235 Certiorari was sought and granted on the narrower issue of what standards should be ap-
plicable to aider and abettor liability under the cause of action courts had implied from § xo(b).
See id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236 See id. at 1455. Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg joined in Justice Stevens's
opinion.
237 See id. at 1456.
238 See id. at 1458-59 & n.8 (relying on the I988 amendments and committee reports to the
1983 amendments to the Securities Act). The 1983 report approvingly noted "judicial application
of the concept of aiding and abetting liability to achieve the remedial purposes of the securities
laws." H.R. REP. No. 355, 9 8th Cong., ist Sess. io (1983), quoted in Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at
1458 n.8.
239 Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1458 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). Justice Kennedy conceded that "our cases have not been consistent in
rejecting arguments such as these," id. at 1453, and the Court has regularly followed Justice Ste-
vens's precept in securities cases. See SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745-47 (1984);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 732-33 (x975); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S.
403, 412-13 (1962); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845-46
(1986) (deferring to the CFTC's interpretation of the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 12(a)(5), x8 (976) (amended 1983), in part, because Congress had twice amended the statute
without overruling the CFTC's interpretation); cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 68o, 694 n.x (198o)
(overturning a relatively recent lower court consensus where there were no directly supportive
legislative signals that were attached to an amendment to the statute). Justice Kennedy cited
Aaron. See Central Bank, 114 S. CL at 1453.
240 See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54 (Kennedy, J.). Another plausible substantive rea-
son was the current Court's concern for the ramifications of the implied cause of action created
by lower courts under § io(b). Central Bank may have been a compromise: rather than abolishing
the longstanding implied cause of action, the Court would abolish the not-quite-as-longstanding
aiding and abetting liability.
241 See id. at 1448.
[Vol. io8"26
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 80 1994-1995
THE SUPREME COURT - FOREWORD
quences unintended by the enacting Congress - including not just
higher costs but a closing off of professional services to smaller compa-
nies. Justice Kennedy did not explore the equally vast distributional
consequences of closing off this form of liability. For the many de-
frauded investors whose only recourse is against aiders and abettors,
and for the SEC, whose enforcement of the statute would have been
facilitated by an ability to prosecute, and therefore deter, investment
professionals, the result was disappointing.
Although override bills have been introduced in both chambers of
Congress,242 Central Bank will likely survive if financial institutions
mobilize in opposition to legislation. Hence, the Court may have suc-
ceeded in exploiting the difficulty of congressional overrides in order to
redistribute legal rights and obligations in ways that the Court prefers.
The Court's discretion to influence public policy in this way is a con-
sequence of law as equilibrium, but we would urge the Court to be
more cautious in exercising its policymaking discretion than it was in
Central Bank. It serves neither democracy nor the rule of law for the
Court to unsettle a longstanding private equilibrium without well-con-
sidered substantive justification.
If Central Bank had played a role in connection with a securities
offering in the 1930s, competent counsel would have hedged their ad-
vice as to aiding and abetting liability. Because of accumulated au-
thority, counsel in the i98os would have committed malpractice to
have given Central Bank the answer reached by Justice Kennedy. In-
stitutions wanting to know their legal obligations do not rely on iso-
lated texts; they look to practice, including agency rules and advice
letters, judicial decisions, congressional feedback, actions of similarly
situated parties, and the reactions of the agency. If they find a stable
equilibrium - private action induced by .vigilant agency enforcement
that has been upheld repeatedly in court - they will consider that
"law," whatever its relationship to the statutory text. When the
Supreme Court disrupts such a stable practice, as it did in Central
Bank, it is not only unsettling a specific legal regime, but is also rais-
ing the possibility of general insecurity, in which neither private par-
ties nor Congress can rely on settled law. This weakens the Court's
stabilizing role in statutory interpretation, and undermines both demo-
cratic values and rule-of-law values.
B. Clear Statement Rules and the Stealth Constitution
One way in which the Court can appropriately perform its stabiliz-
ing role is to apply clear statement canons to prevent congressional
enactments from unnecessarily traversing constitutional values. When
candidly set forth and applied, clear statement rules are among the
242 See S. 2306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 3447, I03d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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many ways the Court can signal to Congress its concerns about the
constitutionality of government actions. But when the Court transpar-
ently manipulates the canons to fit its own substantive agenda, the
Court places its credibility and legitimacy at risk. Like the Court's
erratic textualist performance in statutory cases, its application of
quasi-constitutional clear statement rules has been tactically clever in
the short-term but institutionally risky in the longer-term. The Court's
adventurism has been most apparent, and most normatively question-
able, in the super-strong clear statement rules protecting states' rights
at the expense of individual rights and national policies. 243
In i99i the Court held in Gregory v. Ashcroft244 that it would have
to be "absolutely certain" that Congress intended "intrusive exercises"
of its Commerce Clause power in statutes regulating the states; 245 ac-
cording to this new super-strong clear statement rule, only an ex-
tremely well-targeted statutory statement would permit the Court to
apply "intrusive" federal statutes against the states. Although we
might disagree with the decision's reasoning, 246 Gregory does have vir-
tues under our theory. It offered and defended a priority rule that
trumps other canons of interpretation. Like Landgraf and Rivers (pre-
sumption against retroactive statutes) and Ratzlaf and Staples (rule
against criminal conviction without proof of specific intent), Gregory
might contribute to a more predictable interpretive regime to guide
Congress's statute writing. Also, such decisions permit the Court to
give some effect to "underenforced" constitutional values,247 without
generating a direct confrontation with Congress. The decision in Greg-
ory was the Court's signal to Congress that the Tenth Amendment has
bite again, after a brief period of toothlessness, at least where Con-
gress regulates the states as states.2 48  This Term, however, the
Amendment showed its teeth in a most unlikely place - the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
243 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 187, at 619-45. We hypothesize that these super-strong
clear statement rules represent an implicit bargain within the Court, between the new textualists
(Scalia, Thomas, sometimes Kennedy) and the federalists (Rehnquist, O'Connor, sometimes Ken-
nedy). The federalists gain an indirect way to protect the states against "excessive" national intru-
sion, while the textualists gain a useful mechanism to interpret unclear statutes without reference
to their b6te noir, legislative history.
244 Sol U.S. 452 (iggi) (O'Connor, J.).
245 Id. at 464.
246 See Philip P. Frickey, Lawnet: The Case of the Missing (Tenth) Amendment, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 755, 763 (199i).
247 See Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311,
315-26 (1987); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213-20 (1978).
248 Chief Justice Stone called the Tenth Amendment a "truism" in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (194), the worst disrespect one can pay to a constitutional provision. Justice
O'Connor reinvoked the truism label but infused it with irony in her opinion in New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-19 (1992), in which she used it to strike down part of a
federal radioactive waste law.
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The issue in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.24 9 was whether the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale of mortgaged real estate conclusively sat-
isfy the Bankruptcy Code's requirement that transfers of property by
insolvent debtors within a year of filing for bankruptcy be in exchange
for "a reasonably equivalent value."250 Based on this plain language,
several lower courts had required a finding of market equivalents for
foreclosure sales.25 1 A closely divided Court, in a majority opinion by
Justice Scalia, held that, so long as the relevant state procedures are
followed, whatever price the sale generates satisfies the Bankruptcy
Code. In other words, the price received for foreclosed property is a
"reasonably equivalent value," whatever its amount.
BFP is an astonishing decision for a textualist, as Justice Souter's
dissenting opinion charged. 25 2 Justice Scalia stoically asserted that
"reasonably equivalent value" is ambiguous language, 253 but even the
Ninth Circuit opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court admitted that
its interpretation conflicts with the "plain-language" of the provision,
and supported its holding through policy analysis. 25 4 The lower
court's ruling sought to avoid injecting uncertainty into the foreclosure
sale bidding process and to ensure the smooth functioning of local real
estate markets. The court also invoked a third policy of respecting
state power in areas of traditional allocative regulation. 2
55
Justice Scalia ultimately jumped on this policy bandwagon, and in
a big way. Invoking Gregory, his opinion reasoned that the statute is
not sufficiently "clear and manifest" to "displace traditional State regu-
lation" of foreclosure sales.25 6 Justice Souter responded that the Bank-
ruptcy Code's policy of voiding certain transfers necessarily .creates
clouds on all sorts of property and contractual transactions otherwise
valid under state law, 25 7 and that Congress considered these federalism
concerns when it amended the Code in 1984 and specifically rejected
an amendment that would have guaranteed the integrity of state fore-
closure sales.
25 8
Justice Souter's arguments strike us as unanswerable under tradi-
tional rule-of-law premises. Even as a matter of quasi-constitutional
249 114 S. Ct. 1757 (i994).
250 '1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
251 See BFP, 114 S. Ct. at i76o-61.
252 See id. at 1768-7o (Souter, J., dissenting). Compare PUD No. i v. Washington Dep't of
Ecology, 114 S. CL igoo, 1916 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
§ 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988), read as a whole, limits the power of states
to impose their own discharge requirements) with id. at 1914-15 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing
that the statute's plain meaning clearly does not attach any constraints on state power).
253 BFP, 114 S. CL at 1766 (opinion for the Court).
254 In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1H44, 1148 (9 th Cir. 1992).
25S See id. at 1148-49.
256 BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765 & n.8 (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (i99o)).
257 See id. at 1775-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
258 See id. at 1767 n.r, 1769-70 & n.6, 1777-78.
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interpretation, BFP was a clumsy move. By applying the super-strong
clear statement rule to federal regulation interfering with state prop-
erty law, Justice Scalia radically expanded Gregory, which involved
only federal regulation of state governments themselves, into an ap-
proach at odds with the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.25 9 This ex-
pansion of Gregory starkly contrasts with Holder and De Grandy, two
cases that did involve direct federal regulation of state governments
and in which the Court failed to mention Gregory.2 60 Tellingly, no
party in BFP cited Gregory.
Although the outcome in BFP strikes us as sensible under the
Ninth Circuit's policy analysis, the Supreme Court's decision under-
mines the Court's rational goals. By giving its policy-driven result an
unsupportable formalist gloss, Justice Scalia's opinion flunks any re-
quirement of judicial candor2 6 1 and raises questions about just when
the apparent meaning of the Bankruptcy Code can be overridden out
of respect for state authority or for some unstated other reason.
262
Contrast Landgraf and Rivers. We lament the result in Rivers,263 but
we endorse the Court's approach in those cases. Justice Stevens's
opinions are refreshingly fair-minded about the strength of opposing
259 Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., xi2 S. Ct. 26o8, 2632-34 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing against narrow construction of express federal statutory
provisions pre-empting state tort remedies).
260 We feel that Gregory concerns must have inspired the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor in Holder. Their rationale for holding that a challenge to the
size of an electoral body is outside the ambit of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act was that there is no
"objective" benchmark for determining what is the "right" size. See Holder v. Hall, x14 S. Ct.
2581, 2586 (1994) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.); id. at 2589-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment). In most instances this would be no decisive objection, for in statutory
cases the Court is routinely called upon to make such political judgments. The plurality's con-
cern, however, was that the Court should require more determinate guidance from Congress - a
clearer statement - when those judgments relate to electoral configurations, which are core state
functions under Gregory.
261 For a description of the requirements of judicial candor, consult David L. Shapiro, In De-
fense of Judicial Candor, ioo HARV. L. REv. 731, 732-36 (1987). But see Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 4o6-12 (1989) (arguing that the
complexity of factors in a judicial decision make an attempt at candor a chimerical venture). We
are also disturbed by an unmistakable distributional drift in this Term's cases, which one after
another made it harder to penalize or police fraudulent conduct. Aside from BFP, Central Bank,
and Ratzlaf (cases we have already discussed), see O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048,
2056 (1994), which reversed the Ninth Circuit's creation of a federal rule to allow prosecution of
savings and loan fraud, and ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, x14 S. Ct. 835, 839-40 (x994),
which acquiesced in the NLRB's granting of relief to an employee who perjured himself. This is
in marked contrast to the Court's aforementioned lack of solicitude for the procedural rights of
defendants accused of non-white collar crimes.
262 See Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 571-98 (993) (making a pragmatic case for
applying the strictly textualist approach to the Bankruptcy Code).
263 The presumption against statutory retroactivity need not apply when Congress is "restor-
ing" prior rights, as it did when it overrode the Court's unanticipated decision in Patterson. See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 29, ch. 8.
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arguments (conceding, for example, the good textual arguments favor-
ing retroactivity) and present a thoughtfully worked out interpretive
regime for statutory retroactivity issues that surely will be helpful to
Congress.
BFP suggests a more subtle problem with the Court's interest in
promoting underenforced constitutional norms through clear statement
rules: the dangers of stealth constitutionalism. Insistence upon a
super-clear statement from Congress when its statutes venture close to
- but not beyond - a constitutional periphery is a way for the Court
to enforce its favored constitutional values, but without risking an
open confrontation with Congress. Justice Scalia's opinion in BFP, by
contrast, contained no analysis of the constitutional concerns and
made no effort to understand the Court's pre-Gregory precedents, or
even Gregory itself. The decisions surely came as a surprise to Con-
gress. Indeed, there is a "bait and switch" feature to cases like Gregory
and BFP: when Congress enacted the statutes in question, the consti-
tutionality of the state-infringing provisions was clear and Congress
could not have anticipated the Gregory rule; nor could a reasonable
observer have predicted the expansion of Gregory in BFP. When the
Court's practice induces Congress to behave in a certain way and the
Court then switches the rules, Congress justifiably feels taken.
264
We are open to the response that the Court should be free to de-
velop workable precepts of interpretation and harmonization rules,
and that such development necessarily involves shifts in direction.
Moreover, we do not counsel the Court to abandon constitutional con-
cerns when it interprets statutes, and we offer Landgraf as an exem-
plar. Justice Stevens's opinion openly explored the constitutional
values and crafted a presumption that accommodated those values and
reflected a fair view of the Court's precedents. His opinion should
have come as no surprise to Congress. Unfortunately, with the excep-
tion of Landgraf, the Court has taken a casual rather than systematic
and reflective approach to interpretive principles.
To illustrate this concern, contrast BFP with Hagen v. Utah.265
The question in Hagen was whether a turn-of-the-century federal stat-
ute had retracted the boundaries of an Indian reservation, thereby
leaving outside the reservation, and within state criminal jurisdiction,
264 Cf. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2ox8, 2026 (i994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (discussing a clear example of "bait-and-switch taxation"). For an Eleventh rather than
Tenth Amendment example of bait and switch, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 187, at
638-39. The utility of such a strategy is reduced once Congress becomes aware of what is going
on, and the confirmation hearings for Justice Breyer reveal that Senator Biden, the Chair of the
Judiciary Committee, is aware of and strongly concerned about the Court's strategy. See Supreme
Court Confirnation Hearing for Judge Stephen G. Breyer Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
I03d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 13, 1994, Afternoon Session), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fednew File.
265 114 S. CL 958 (1994).
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the area in which the petitioner had allegedly committed a crime. The
Solicitor General argued that the Court should hold that Congress
may diminish an Indian reservation only through a statute containing,
in the words of the Court, "explicit language of cession or other lan-
guage evidencing the surrender of tribal interests and an unconditional
commitment from Congress to compensate the Indians. 266 The
Court's precedents on the diminishment of reservations are a hope-
lessly conflicting lot if assessed from rule-of-law values, 267 and the So-
licitor General's suggestion would have provided substantial coherence
to this area of the law.268 In one paragraph, however, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion rejected the proposal because precedent
established that the canon protecting tribal interests was merely a pre-
sumption, not a clear statement rule.2 69 Ultimately, the Court applied
the presumption only weakly, allowing a statute with ambiguous lan-
guage to effect a diminishment. The Court found evidence of statutory
meaning in sources that the Court currently disfavors - post-enact-
ment congressional signals, later administrative practice, and the cur-
rent character of the land area in question, which is largely non-
Indian.2 7
0
From the perspective of law as equilibrium, this result - driven
by a judicial appreciation of current context and post-enactment sig-
nals - is unexceptional so long as no serious public values are at
stake. Unlike BFP, however, there are structural values - recognized
since the Marshall Court - implicated in any diminishment of tribal
interests. Hagen, and not BFP, would have been an appropriate case
for the Court to create a stronger clear statement rule. If canons are
designed, as we believe and the Court maintains they are, to create a
predictable interpretive regime, the Court's use of them makes little
sense in either case: BFP left Bankruptcy Code interpretation less pre-
dictable than before, and Hagen missed an opportunity to inject pre-
dictability into a chaotic series of Indian law precedents. The
apparent explanation of the Court's divergent approach in the cases is
its greater concern for the integrity of state property transactions than
for the integrity of tribal jurisdiction.
266 Id. at 96s.
267 See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. Rnv. 1137, 1144-5O, 118o (iggo).
268 A strong canon protecting tribal interests would also promote the rule of law in other ways,
primarily by being true to Marshall Court-era precedent and in recognizing and protecting the
structural, sovereign nature of the federal-tribal relationship, similar to the way in which Gregory
protects state governments from all but clearly advertent federal regulation. See, e.g., Philip P.
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Fed-
eral Indian Law, 1o7 HARV. L. REV. 381, 440 (1993).
269 See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965-66.
270 See id. at 967-70.
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The approaches bandied about in these cases - and in the rule of
lenity cases discussed above - look more like loose cannons than lu-
cid canons. The incoherence of the Court's approach reflects the ten-
sion that exists between the temptation the Court faces to invoke the
canons selectively in support of the Court's substantive values and in-
stitutional position, and the role the Court has declared for itself to set
forth an interpretive regime of rules and guides for statutory drafters
and interpreters. The latter is obviously better for the country and,
ultimately, for the Court as well. While the short-term benefits of
manipulating the canons is apparent, the long-term harm should also
be considered. If the Court both creates a coherent interpretive regime
such as we have outlined in the Appendix and then applies it with
some constancy, then the Court has not only served a core function of
the judiciary but has also revealed its usefulness to the political
branches. In that event, the Court can enhance its credibility when it
does have a well-considered constitutional objection to a course of ac-
tion undertaken by the political branches.
C. The Role of Constitutional Discourse:
Mediation and Rupture
Law as equilibrium, which assumes the values of continuity, stabil-
ity, and predictability, might seem least plausible or desirable in the
context of constitutional law. Has not the Court frequently upset
political equilibria with activist exercises of judicial review? Are there
not occasions in which, regardless of the institutional implications, ju-
dicial review injects a needed normative counterweight into public pol-
icy? In our view, however, our model not only explains the Court's
exercises of judicial review well but also provides a useful lens
through which to view the normative debates surrounding judicial
review.
Law as equilibrium provides both an explanation and a defense for
Brown v. Board of Education,27x for example. Because segregation re-
flected a distinctly local - not national - policy 272 that was inconsis-
tent with the values held by the Justices, the Court had strong
incentives for activism in this area. Those incentives were strength-
ened by the institutional paralysis of Congress, thwarted by Southern
filibusterers from overriding apartheid itself but equally unwilling to
discourage the Court. Thus, the Court in Brown operated within an
271 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
272 The only national policy of apartheid was racial segregation in the armed forces, which had
been formally ended by executive order in 1948, but was not actually ended in the Army and the
Marine Corps until the Korean War. See MoRRis J. MAcGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE
ARMED FORCES, 1940-1965, at 616-17 (ig8i). Apartheid was also at war with national policies,
such as the Cold War contrast between "free" America and "enslaved" communist bloc states. See
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980).
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institutional framework which provided it the impetus as well as the
freedom to abolish American apartheid. Nonetheless, the Court, surely
understanding that its long-term institutional capital was on the line,
implemented Brown slowly. Brown II obligated the recalcitrant states
to desegregate public education only "with all deliberate speed,"273 and
when many school boards did nothing the Court remained mute. The
Court also immediately ducked the socially charged issue of antimis-
cegenation laws. 274 When a strong national consensus favoring racial
justice emerged in the I96Os and took root in the Johnson White
House and the Great Society Congress, the Court was much better
situated institutionally to enforce Brown in more than a grudging way.
Not surprisingly, the Court ordered recalcitrant school districts to de-
segregate immediately 275 and invalidated state antimiscegenation
statutes.2
76
Brown reveals one important normative role for the Court in adju-
dicating constitutional challenges to state and local policies: the en-
forcement of national norms against recalcitrant or slow-moving
states. 277 This role is also played out, though less dramatically, in the
dormant commerce clause cases which invalidate local economic poli-
cies disrupting free national markets. State and local cases can also
reveal a more subtle role for the Court: mediation. The issues on
which our society is riven - including abortion, the death penalty,
censorship, freedom of religion and the role of religious belief in the
political sphere, sexuality and its regulation - are played out mostly
at the state and local levels. On such emotionally charged issues, an
institutional viewpoint suggests that the Court would avoid taking a
position that flatly repudiates the concerns of a politically salient inter-
est, but would instead attempt to mediate a controversy in a way that
accommodates the primary needs of each warring group. We believe
the Court has adopted such a rational strategy on issues of abortion,
affirmative action, and the death penalty.
278
273 See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (x955).
274 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 89i (i955), dismissed by 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
275 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
276 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. i, 12 (1967).
277 We think the Court missed an opportunity to enforce such a norm this Term in Campbell
v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (i994), in which the Court denied certiorari and thereby allowed the
State of Washington to impose capital punishment by hanging. This form of execution is physi-
cally "cruel" and now unusual, surviving in only two states and South Africa. See Campbell v.
Wood, i8 F.3d 662, 697-703, 726-28 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
278 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (joint opinion) (reaffirming but
reinterpreting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a compromise contrary to the positions of both
parties); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(disallowing outright racial quotas but permitting race to be considered as a plus factor); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98 (1976) (plurality opinion) (abandoning Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) and allowing states to impose the death penalty, but only under circumstances in
which the jury's discretion is carefully controlled).
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In the 1993 Term, this mediating approach was illustrated by Mad-
sen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.279 The Court upheld an injunction
that created a 36-foot "buffer zone" separating Operation Rescue and
other pro-life protesters from a health clinic performing abortions, but
the Court invalidated the injunction's 3oo-foot buffer zone around the
homes of clinic employees and bar against protesters approaching cli-
ents of the clinic. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion applied an impro-
vised level of First Amendment scrutiny, a more rigorous version of
intermediate scrutiny. This framework raises the same analytic con-
cerns we voiced in connection with Turner Broadcasting,2 10 but the
Chief Justice's opinion effected a compromise that strikes us as Solo-
monic.28' The decision prohibited the most threatening and disruptive
conduct, and duly signalled lower courts (by the Court's adoption of
something less demanding than strict scrutiny) that they can fashion
creative relief in these tense situations. On the other hand, the con-
duct that is most like traditional persuasive speech was deregulated,
and lower courts were duly signalled that they ought to prohibit no
more speech than necessary to protect clients and workers. Most im-
portant, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion insisted that courts be avail-
able to referee future clashes between Operation Rescue and abortion
clinics. The Court cannot control the intensity of people's feelings
about abortion, but it can create national strategies that keep people
from one another's throats.
The hardest question under our theory is when, if ever, the Court
should disrupt a national equilibrium. Few examples exist in which
even the Warren Court disrupted a national equilibrium through judi-
cial review.28 2 The Court has often upheld national equilibria that, if
adopted at the state level, would have almost surely been invali-
dated.28 3 Nonetheless, consistent with the "free speech tradition" that
279 114 S. CL 2516 (i994).
280 See supra pp. 47-48. The Madsen injunction targeted a specific group with a particular
message. Regulations that discriminate in this way usually require strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), which we think could be
satisfied in this case by the burden the protests placed on the clients' rights to abortion and
medical counseling.
281 But see Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2534 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the "appearance of
moderation and Solomonic wisdom" of the Court's judgment is "deceptive").
282 The most famous exercises in Warren Court activism involved displacement of local or
state equilibria. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463-91 (1966) (applying rules already
generally followed by FBI to state police officers); Griswold v. Connecticut, 38! U.S. 479, 481--86
(1965) (invalidating anomalous state statute criminalizing contraception); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 584-87 (1964) (requiring malapportioned state legislatures to reapportion); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-6o (i96i) (applying to the states the exclusionary rule already in place for
federal prosecutors).
283 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (944) (upholding criminal conviction
of Japanese-American who refused to relocate from the West Coast); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 1o4-o5 (i943) (upholding criminal conviction of Japanese-American refusing
to obey curfew order).
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has developed in the twentieth century,28 4 the Court in recent years
has favored freedom of expression even in settings in which society is
intolerant.28 5 The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ap-
pears to us to be the strongest, most consensual rule-of-law area in
constitutional discourse. To be sure, most invalidations have involved
state censorship, 28 6 and in the context of federal restrictions on expres-
sion, the Court has tended to give the federal political branches ample
room to demonstrate that apparent censorship is justified (recall Thr-
ner Broadcasting). Only when the national political branches have
failed to deliberate on the relevant constitutional values has the Court
exercised its authority to disrupt the equilibrium. A few illustrations
follow.
In the 1950s, the Court declined to invalidate the Smith Act, which
made it a crime to advocate overthrowing the federal government by
force or violence.28 7 As the decade of McCarthyism unfolded and it
became clear that the federal political branches were not deliberating
about and accommodating free speech values, the Court took a care-
fully calibrated approach to reasserting the primacy of free speech
without undue institutional disruption or much chance of an embar-
rassing override by the political branches. In Kent v. Dulles,288 the
Court took a narrow, quasi-constitutional route to invalidate the State
Department's rule forbidding the issuance of passports to American
citizens who were identified as communists. Rather than strike down
the rule as a violation of the First Amendment, the Court held that,
because of the serious constitutional values at stake, only a clear state-
ment authorizing the State Department to disqualify the applicant
could suffice. Despite quick denunciations from President Eisenhower
and some congressional leaders, the Court escaped this situation with-
out formal rebuke, even though a statute rather than constitutional
amendment would have effected an override.28 9 In later cases, the
Court continued its policy of deferring formally to the national equilib-
rium that communist affiliation was criminal, but nonetheless found
284 See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA at
xviii-xxi (r988).
285 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398 (1989) (invalidating, in an opinion joined by
Scalia and Kennedy, state statute criminalizing desecration of American flag); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (striking down, in a majority opinion by Justice Harlan, the Warren
Court's most conservative Justice, the disturbing-the-peace conviction of a man wearing a "fuck
the draft" jacket in a state courthouse).
286 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (I969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 265 (x964).
287 See Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17
(1951).
288 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
289 See Daniel A. Farber, National Security, the Right to Ravel, and the Court, x981 Sup. CT.
REV. 263, 278-81.
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narrow ways to invalidate Smith Act prosecutions.
290 As the Red
Scare ebbed, the Court deserved some of the credit, even though it
avoided the depletion of its institutional capital that an outright invali-
dation of the Smith Act and similar schemes would have caused.
More recently, the Court in Texas v. Johnson291 struck down a
state statute forbidding flag desecration. Consistent with our model,
the state rather than federal origin of the statute may have simplified
this exercise. When Congress immediately enacted a similar federal
statute without much deliberation about First Amendment values, the
Court held its ground and struck the new statute down as well.
2 92
The Court was denounced in some circles, but may have actually
gained in stature through its imposition of the rule of law in the face
of political rhetoric. We suggest that the failure of Congress to show
any appreciation for the First Amendment tradition 29
3 radically de-
creased the deference that one otherwise would have expected the
Court to give congressional products. Concomitantly, the Court's con-
fidence in its First Amendment rule-of-law values gave it the impetus
to stick with its approach and to weather the institutional storm. In-
deed, the legislative background of the federal flag desecration statute
left no doubt that the Court was the only national institution situated
to enforce rule-of-law values.
In contrast, when the Court views the congressional deliberations
as seriously taking constitutional values into account, the Court has
been deferential, even in circumstances in which it would have invali-
dated a similar state statute. Perhaps the best recent example is
Rostker v. Goldberg,294 where the majority of the Court upheld the
exclusion of women from selective service registration at least in part
because it was convinced that Congress had squarely addressed and
carefully deliberated the rule-of-law values implicated by this
discrimination.
29 S
290 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 251-55 (ig6i) (interpreting the Smith Act nar-
rowly to set aside convictions); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957) (same). Only
some years later did the Warren Court, again in a case involving state censorship, directly under-
cut the doctrinal basis for upholding measures that made communist affiliation illegal. See Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
291 491 U.S. 397 (I989).
292 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-i9 (i99o).
293 See John A. Clark & Kevin T. McGuire, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Deci-
sion Making: The Flag Burning Cases 14-16 (April 14, 1994) (unpublished paper presented at the
1994 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association) (showing that members' votes
were influenced, in addition to pressure from constituents, by their own policy preferences rather
than concerns for the constitutional values reflected in flag desecration).
294 453 U.S. 57 (i98i).
295 See id. at 7o (stating that "Congress and its Committees carefully considered and debated
two alternative" proposals); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (suggesting
that, had sex classification in federal social security statute been based on "a deliberate congres-
sional intention to remedy the arguably greater needs" of certain women, it might well have been
upheld).
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Two cases the Court saw but did not resolve this Term suggest a
further role that an equilibrium Court might play in constitutional
cases: United States Department of Defense v. Meinhold,296 in which a
gay serviceman challenged the pre-1993 military exclusion of bisexuals,
lesbians, and gay men, and Evans v. Romer,297 the challenge to Colo-
rado's constitutional initiative prohibiting state or local laws that ad-
vantage sexual orientation minorities. Both issues will return to the
Court throughout the decade and will provide our legal process Court
with challenging constitutional moments. An institutional analysis, su-
perficially consistent with our theory of law as equilibrium, would sug-
gest judicial deference to recent legislative and popular majorities, and
that may be the path the Court will choose. But the Court has power-
ful incentives to surprise the pundits on this issue. A deeper norma-
tive lesson of law as equilibrium is that the Court's long-term position
will be undermined by short-sighted deference in either situation.
The institutional case for judicial restraint is formidable. The cur-
rent Court has revealed itself to be both ambivalent and embarrassed
about issues of sexuality, and wholly confused about homosexuality in
particular.2 98 The first impulse of such a Court is not to leap to the
defense of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. The least likely arena for
the Court's intervention is the United States armed forces, where na-
tional security concerns reinforce the Court's deferential tendencies (re-
call Weiss 299). Although Meinhold arose under the pre-1993 version of
the military exclusion, the 1993 compromise reached in the political
process - "don't ask, don't tell" - augurs against judicial interven-
tion even if the Court were otherwise inclined.
An institutionalist perspective should not stop with the foregoing
deferential analysis, however. For the reasons developed earlier in this
Foreword, state anti-homosexual policies will usually be more constitu-
tionally vulnerable than national policies, especially if the policies be-
ing challenged strike the Court as out-of-line with the drift of national
debate. Hence, we should expect some support within the Court for
striking down laws like the Colorado initiative if the Court perceives
the anti-gay initiative movement to be an example of temporary and
parochial gay-bashing. For similar reasons, an all-or-nothing frontal
attack on the military's exclusion is unlikely to succeed. On the other
hand, as Justice Ginsburg signalled in Weiss,300 a more narrow chal-
296 114 S. Ct. 374 (i993) (mem.) (granting in part the Solicitor General's request for a stay of
the district court's order awarding relief, pending the case's disposition on appeal in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals).
297 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (x993).
298 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346-48 (1992).
299 114 S. CL 752 (1994).
30 See id. at 769 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that the Court's "close inspection" of the
claims asserted in Weiss reaffirms the courts' function of ensuring "that the men and women
constituting our Armed Forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not
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lenge to the exclusion "as applied" might be successful. As the Court
did in the communist prosecutions during the 195Os, the Court in the
199os might be willing to invoke due process or free speech protec-
tions to prevent the exclusion of personnel, such as Keith Meinhold,
who merely express their identity.30'
The Court would take some heat for any decision questioning the
military exclusion, even a fact-specific "as applied" challenge. Why
should a conservative Court, ambivalent about the relationship be-
tween law and sexuality, take such short-term risks? As we now ar-
gue, the Court's longer-term institutional interests would not be served
by deference even in the context of the armed forces (the hardest case
under our model). To begin with, discrimination on the basis of status,
rooted in hostility toward an unpopular group, is deeply inconsistent
with constitutional rule-of-law values that the Court is uniquely
charged with enforcing.
30 2
Like the McCarthy era witchhunts against supposed communists,
there is an element of hysteria and even viciousness in congressional
hostility to gays and lesbians.30 3 Moreover, any exclusion is inconsis-
tent with our constitutional traditions of free speech and equal citizen-
ship. Soldiers who may not reveal their sexual preference are
prohibited from conversing about issues of sexuality in the most pow-
erful way human beings persuade each other - by injecting one's per-
sonal perspective. Nor can society pretend that it is treating the
lesbian or gay soldier as an equal citizen. Would the Brown Court
have tolerated a system which allowed African-American children to
attend white schools if they could "pass" as whites? A regime holding
turn on the charity of a military commander" (quoting Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57,
59-6o (1968) (Douglas, J., opinion in chambers))).
301 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-51, 254-55 (I957) (finding that the
State Attorney General's investigation into subversive persons constituted an infringement of First
Amendment rights and that the imposition of a contempt sanction for refusals to answer questions
is a denial of due process); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 243-47 (I957)
(holding that the State Board of Bar Examiners' refusal to allow a former member of the Com-
munist Party to take the bar exam, in large part because of his prior Communist Party affiliation,
represented a denial of due process).
302 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (demonstrating
that "mere negative attitudes, or fear" on the part of private citizens cannot form a rational basis
for government action); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
303 See POSNER, supra note 298, at 346. Congress's recent actions reinforce the suspicion that
its military policy is rooted in insufficient attention to constitutional values. Sixty-three members
of the Senate recently voted to withhold federal funds from public schools that provided counsel-
ing that affirms homosexuality as a positive lifestyle choice. See Senate Votes to End Funding to
Schools That Teach Gay Acceptance, CHI. TRB., Aug. 2, 1994, at 7. We find it impossible to label
this anything but mean-spirited. Under any conception of homosexuality, even one rooted in out-
moded notions of personality disorder, denying counseling is simply inhuman. The Senate did
reverse this vote once its implications were apparent See Helms Loses Bid to Ban Talk of Gays
in Schools, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1994, at A4.
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open the prospect of citizenship only upon terms of anonymity is more
rather than less discriminatory.
30 4
Under our view of law as equilibrium, the Court ought to be sensi-
tive to assertions of citizenship by previously marginalized groups that
are no longer willing to accept their unequal status. Openly gay peo-
ple are. everywhere, including one of the authors of this Foreword.30 5
The public presence of open bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians reflects
an ongoing redistribution of social and political power and makes it
increasingly difficult to sustain any policy that treats them differently
from other citizen groups. Accordingly, a Court that flatly sustains
openly anti-homosexual regulations is a Court that risks looking as
foolish or short-sighted as the Plessy and Korematsu Courts, which de-
ferred to popular prejudice and upheld segregation of Americans by
race. Both decisions undermined the Court's claim to protect a consti-
tutional rule of law. Just as racial apartheid was an unstable equilib-
rium in the long term, so an apartheid of the closet 30 6 is similarly
unstable once there are cracks in the closet door.
Conversely, a Court deferring to an unstable consensus will have
missed an opportunity to facilitate an extremely useful dialogue within
our pluralism.30 7  A critical role, perhaps ultimately the critical role,
for the Court in a pluralist society is to facilitate the integration of
new groups and interests into the existing system. The challenge for
the current Court in the gay rights cases is to find some way to recon-
cile the unease felt by popular majorities with Justice Harlan's insis-
tence in his Plessy dissent that "there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens . . . .In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law."308 A tragedy of Bowers v. Hard-
wick is that the Court's construction of the case as one where "homo-
304 A recently published biography of Justice Powell, who provided the crucial swing vote in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. x86 (1986), indicates that Justice Powell's inability to validate
homosexual citizenship was rooted in a profound ignorance about the widespread presence of
homosexuals in society. Although gay men and lesbians had in fact worked for him as judicial
clerks, Justice Powell believed at the time of his critical Bowers vote that he had never met a
"homosexual." See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 511-30 (1994).
305 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 644-45 (994)
(continuing a tradition inaugurated by Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979)).
306 See EVE K. SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET paSsim (990).
307 Many commentators have recognized the distinctive role courts can play in enhancing the
political discourse. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 9I MICH. L. REV.
577, 581 (1993) (describing "an America in which courts are a vital functioning part of political
discourse, not some bastard child standing aloof from legitimate political dialogue"); Louis M.
Seidman & Mark V. "Ihshnet, The Empty Vessel: Constitutional Discourse in the Age of Cyni-
cism (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School library); cf. Michael E.
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Supreme Court, Judicial Review, and the Public: Leadership
versus Dialogue, ri CONST. COMM. 1, 5 (1994) (describing the Court's leadership function in cre-
ating new popular majorities).
308 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (r896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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sexual" but not "heterosexual" sodomy would be outside the law30 9
defensively asserted a caste superiority that has unsettled rather than
settled the issue.310 The Court's effort in that case to close off discus-
sion - to closet discourse - by reasserting outdated ways of under-
standing homosexuality has undermined the Court's credibility as a
neutral arbiter of law.
The military's supression of lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity
("don't tell") is a censorship of dissent about gender and sexual orien-
tation that parallels the government's suppression of flagburning. In
striking down both state and federal flagburning statutes, the Court
was hardly sanctioning deviant activity, and surely some of the Jus-
tices took pride in protecting expressive activity they personally dis-
liked. The Court as an institution suffered short-term criticism but
has ultimately improved its stature by insisting upon First Amendment
principles against temporary majorities. The Court has a similar op-
portunity in the gay rights cases. The Court ought to preclude the
government from segregating lesbians and gay men into second-class
citizenship and, even more so, from penalizing people for saying who
they are.
CONCLUSION
In our judgment, the traditional debate in Supreme Court com-
mentary between legal formalism, which praises rule-of-law values,
and legal realism, which maintains that judicial personal preferences
rule, misses a third important explanatory inquiry: the institutional
perspective. In this Foreword, we have proposed one way of setting
institutional analysis on an equal plane with formalism and realism.
We believe that law as equilibrium provides an insightful avenue to
assess the behavior of the Supreme Court in both its descriptive and
309 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86, 188 n.2, 189 (i986).
310 See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 645 n.95 (iggo) (citing 33 law review articles and
comments critical of Bowers). The decision has been criticized as bad history, see Anne B. Gold-
stein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, io8i-gi (1988); as undermining self-governance, see
Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YaLE L.J. 1493, 1494-99, 1532-37 (1987); as ignorant,
see POSNER, supra note 298, at 341-5o; as homophobic, see Thomas B. Stoddard, Essay, Bowers
v. Hardwicl" Precedent by Personal Predilection 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648, 6S5-56 (1987); and as
slippery, see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1741-42 (i993). Commentators have all but uniformly urged the
Court to overrule Bowers and have asserted grounds of due process, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER
AND LAW 81-84 (iggi); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 799-802
(z989); equal protection, see Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law
as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988); freedom of expression, see David Cole &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homo-
sexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.RL-C.L. L. REV. 319, 325-30 (1994); or cruel and unu-
sual punishment, see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431,
1461 (1992).
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normative dimensions. If, as Hart and Sacks urged, "[l]aw is a doing
of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the
basic problems of social living,"311 it makes no sense to assess it in
isolation from the institutional setting within which it must be done.
No doubt even the reader who finds our self-styled "thought exper-
iment" useful also finds it incomplete. But if we have raised more
questions than we have answered, they strike us as important ques-
tions to be raised. We will have served our purpose if our theory of
law as equilibrium has left the skeptical reader in intellectual
disequilibrium.
311 HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 148.
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APPENDIX
THE REHNQUIST COURT'S CANONS
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This Appendix collects the canons of statutory construction that
have been used or developed by the Rehnquist Court, from the 1986
through the 1993 Terms of the Court (inclusive). The Appendix di-
vides the canons into three conventional categories: the textual canons
setting forth conventions of grammar and syntax, linguistic inferences,
and textual integrity; extrinsic source canons, which direct the inter-
preter to authoritative sources of meaning; and substantive policy ca-
nons which embody public policies drawn from the Constitution,
federal statutes, or the common law.
TEXTUAL CANONS
" Plain meaning rule: follow the plain meaning of the statutory text,'
except when text suggests an absurd result2 or a scrivener's error.
3
LINGUISTIC INFERENCES
" Expressio unius: expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of
others.
4
" Noscitur a sociis: interpret a general term to be similar to more spe-
cific terms in a series.
5
I See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., i2 S. CL 2589, 2594 (1992); United States v.
Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1988). But see id. at 7o8, 7IO (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("[The Court has] long held that in construing a statute, [it is] not bound to follow the literal
language of the statute - 'however clear the words may appear on superficial examination' -
when doing so leads to 'absurd,' or even 'unreasonable,' results." (quoting United States v. Amer-
ican Trucking Ass'ns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
2 See United States v. Wilson, II2 S. CL 1351, 1354 (1992); Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp., 112 S. CL 1311, 1316-17 (1992); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 51o-11 (1989).
3 See United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents, 113 S. CL 2173, 2186
(I993).
4 See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. CL 2048, 2054 (1994); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
DisL, 491 U.S. 701, 730-31 (z989); Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 133-34 (2989).
But see Burns v. United States, 5o1 U.S. 129, 136 (r99I) ("(Ain inference drawn from Congres-
sional silence certainly cannot be credited."); Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891-92 (1989)
(refusing to read an express provision in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(3)
(1982), which allows for the recovery of fee awards in adversarial administrative proceedings, to
generate a "negative implication" that the court lacks power to award such fees in a nonadver-
sarial proceeding)
5 See Beecham v. United States, 114 S. CL 669, 1671 (1994); Dole v. United Steelworkers,
494 U.S. 26, 36 (i99o); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, r14-15 (1989).
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* Ejusdem generis: interpret a general term to reflect the class of ob-
jects reflected in more specific terms accompanying it.6
* Follow ordinary usage of terms, unless Congress gives them a speci-
fied or technical meaning.7
" Follow dictionary definitions of terms, unless Congress has provided
a specific definition.8 Consider dictionaries of the era in which the
statute was enacted. 9 Do not consider "idiosyncratic" dictionary
definitions.10
" "May" is usually precatory, while "shall" is usually mandatory."
" "Or" means in the alternative. 12
GRAMMAR AND SYNTAX
" Punctuation rule: Congress is presumed to follow accepted punctua-
tion standards, so that placements of commas and other punctuation
are assumed to be meaningful.'
3
* Do not have to apply the "rule of the last antecedent" if not
practical. 14
TEXTUAL INTEGRITY
* Each statutory provision should be read by reference to the whole
act.15 Statutory interpretation is a "holistic" endeavor.
16
" Avoid interpreting a provision in a way that would render other
provisions of the Act superfluous or unnecessary. 17
" Avoid interpreting a provision in a way inconsistent with the policy
of another provision.'
8
6 See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 (i99o).
7 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
8 See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. xoS, 113 (1988).
9 See St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 6zo-ii (1987).
10 See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2229-30 (1994).
11 See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989).
12 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 1i4 S. Ct. 2239, 2244-45 (1994).
13 See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (i989); San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1987).
14 See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 21o6, 2111 (993).
15 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 523
(993); Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123-24 (i989); Massachu-
setts v. Morash, 490 U.S. o7, 114-,5 (1989).
16 See Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2057 (1993); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
17 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (i994); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 778 (1988) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476
U.S. 498, 51o n.22 (1986). But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 2493-95 (i994)
(acknowledging that petitioner's textual argument, based upon "the canon that a court should
give effect to every provision of a statute," "has some force" but refusing to accept the averred
meaning, because it was "unlikely that Congress intended the (disputed clause) to carry the criti-
cally important meaning pertitioner assigns it").
18 See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
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" Avoid interpreting a provision in a way that is inconsistent with a
necessary assumption of another provision. 19
* Avoid interpreting a provision in a way that is inconsistent with the
structure of the statute.
20
" Avoid broad readings of statutory provisions if Congress has specifi-
cally provided for the broader policy in more specific language
elsewhere.
2'
" Interpret the same or similar terms in a statute the same way.22
" Specific provisions targetting a particular issue apply instead of pro-
visions more generally covering the issue.
23
" Provisos and statutory exceptions should be read narrowly.24




" Rule of deference to agency interpretations, unless contrary to plain
meaning of statute or unreasonable.
26
" Rule of extreme deference when there is express delegation of law-
making duties to agency.27




* Rule of continuity: assume that Congress does not create discontinu-
ities in legal rights and obligations without some clear statement.
29
19 See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct 2374, 2384 (1992).
20 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 66i, 668-69 (i99o); Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987).
21 See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct 1732, 1736 ('994); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Harris Tfust & Say. Bank, 1I4 S. Ct. 517, 524 (1993); West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey,
449 U.S. 83, 92 (1991).
22 See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484-85 (i99o); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of In-
wood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
23 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524-26 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co.
v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444-45 (i987).
24 See Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
2S See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 16o, 166-67 (99I).
26 See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 88-89 (I99O); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific,
Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990); id. at 797 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1988).
27 See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct 835, 839-40 (1994).
28 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalaa, 114 S. Ct 2381, 2386-87 (994); Mullins Coal Co.
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (987).
29 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1989); Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 945, 554 (I989).
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* Presumption that Congress uses same term consistently in different
statutes.3
0
* Super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents.31
" Presumption that international agreements do not displace federal
law.
3 2
* Borrowed statute rule: when Congress borrows a statute, it adopts
by implication interpretations placed on that statute, absent express
statement to the contrary.
33
" Re-enactment rule: when Congress re-enacts a statute, it incorpo-
rates settled interpretations of the re-enacted statute.3 4 The rule is
inapplicable when there is no settled standard Congress could have
known.35
" Acquiescence rule: consider unbroken line of lower court decisions
interpreting statute,3 6 but do not give them decisive weight.
3 7
EXTRINSIC LEGISLATIVE SOURCES
* Interpret provision consistent with subsequent statutory amend-
ments,3 8 but do not consider subsequent legislative discussions.
3 9
" Consider legislative history if the statute is ambiguous.
40
30 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2244-45 (1994); Smith v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2o56-57 (1993).
31 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 498-99 (iggo); Maislin Indus., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-33 (i99o).
32 See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
538-39 (1987).
33 See Molzof v. United States, X12 S. Ct. 711, 716 (1992); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Tay-
lor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987). But see Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (1994)
(declining to construe the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C., §§ 17, 4241-4247
(1988), in accord with prior judicial interpretations of the District of Columbia statute upon which
the Act was based by finding the applicable canon to be "merely a 'presumption of legislative
intention' to be invoked only 'under suitable conditions'" (quoting Carolene Products Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (194))).
34 See Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 482 (iggo); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
566-68 (1988).
35 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. CL 1023, 1030-33 (1994).
36 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (1992); Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan,
486 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1988).
37 See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452-53 (994).
38 See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 149-51 (1987).
39 See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628 n.8 (i99o); id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part). But see Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 1x3 S. Ct. 2085,
2089 (1993) (inferring congressional approval of judicial regulation of the implied xob-5 cause of
action from subsequent congressional legislation acknowledging such a cause of action "without
any further expression of legislative intent to define it"); cf. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 969
(1994) (considering history of legislative amendment to subsequent act as evidence that the later
act incorporated the provisions of an earlier act, even though the amendment was ultimately
rejected).
40 See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 5o1 U.S. 597, 61o n.4 (0991).
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* Committee reports are authoritative legislative history,4 1 but cannot
trump a textual plain meaning,4 2 and should not be relied on if they
are "imprecise.
'43
" Committee report language that cannot be tied to a specific statu-
tory provision cannot be credited.44 House and Senate reports in-
consistent with one another should be discounted.
45
" Presumption against interpretation considered and rejected by floor
vote of a chamber of Congress or committee.
46
* Floor statements can be used to confirm apparent meaning.
4 7
* Contemporaneous and subsequent understandings of a statutory
scheme (including understandings by President and Department of
Justice) may sometimes be admissible.
48
" The "dog didn't bark" canon: presumption that prior legal rule
should be retained if no one in legislative deliberations even men-




" Avoid interpretations that would render a statute unconstitutional.5 0
Inapplicable if statute would survive constitutional attack, or if stat-
utory text is clear. 51
i. Separation of Powers
* Super-strong rule against congressional interference with President's
authority over foreign affairs and national security.
5 2
41 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. CL 2647, 2656 n.9 (1994); Dewsnup v. Timm, X12 S. Ct.
773, 779 (1992); Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 112 S. Ct. 486, 492 (i99i).
42 See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1593 (1994); Repub-
lic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 260, 2168 (1992); American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499
U.S. 6o6, 613 (199).
43 See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S.
Ct. 2251, 2258-59 4994).
44 See Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 4994).
4S See Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 19o5, 19o8 (1993).
46 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (994).
47 See Department of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 14 S. Ct. 843, 851 (1994).
48 See Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 969 (994); Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 2545-47
(x993).
49 See Chisom v. Roemer, So U.S. 380, 396 & n.23 (I99i).
50 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989); Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988).
S See Peretz v. United States, Soi U.S. 923, 932 (I9gi); Rust v. Sullivan, Soo U.S. 173, 182
(199).
S2 See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); United States v. Johnson, 481
U.S. 681, 69o-9I (1987); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (concerning
LSD experiments by the military).
IOI
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* Rule against congressional invasion of the President's core executive
powers.
5 3
" Rule against review of President's core executive actions for "abuse
of discretion."
5 4
" Rule against congressional curtailment of the judiciary's "inherent
powers"55 or its "equity" powers.
5 6
" Rule against congressional expansion of Article I injury in fact to
include intangible and procedural injuries.5
7
" Presumption that Congress does not delegate authority without suf-
ficient guidelines.5
* Presumption against "implying" causes of action into federal
statutes.5 9
* Presumption that U.S. law conforms to U.S. international
obligations. 60
" Rule against congressional abrogation of Indian treaty rights.
61
" Presumption favoring severability of unconstitutional provisions.
62
2. Federalism
* Super-strong rule against federal invasion of "core state functions." 6
3
* Super-strong rule against federal abrogation of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from lawsuits in federal courts.
64
" Rule against inferring enforceable conditions on federal grants to the
states.6
5
53 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682-683 (i988); see also Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93,
99 (1988) (noting the "general proposition" that the executive branch's power to remove officials
from office is incident to the original congressional grant of authority to appoint that official).
54 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2775 (1992).
5 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 5o U.S. 32, 43-44 (99).
56 See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990).
57 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, ii2 S. Ct. 2130, 2135-37 (1992); id. at 2146 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (z989).
59 See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 5o U.S. 1o83, 1102-05 (1991); Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
60 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 256o (x993).
61 See South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. CL 2309, 2315 (993).
62 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
63 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., rr4 S. Ct. 1757, 1764-65 (994); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 461-64 (1991); cf Holder v. Hall, ir4 S. Ct. 258r, 2586 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(refusing to accept "benchmark" size of government in evaluating challenge under the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), that departed from county's chosen use of single-commis-
sioner form of government).
64 See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 5o U.S. 775, 779 (igi); Hoffman v. Connecti-
cut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, ioi (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,
227-28 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 7 (z989) (finding abrogation); see also
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) ("The test for determining whether a
State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.").
65 See Suter v. Artist M, 112 S. CL 136o, 1366 (1992).
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* Rule against congressional expansion of federal court jurisdiction
that would siphon cases away from state courts.
66
* Rule against reading a federal statute to authorize states to engage
in activities that would violate the dormant commerce clause. 67
* Rule favoring concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over
federal claims.6
8
" Rule against federal pre-emption of traditional state functions,69 or
against federal disruption of area of traditional state regulation.
7 0
" Presumption against federal pre-emption of state-assured family sup-
port obligations. 71
* Presumption against federal regulation of intergovernmental taxation
by the states.
72
" Presumption against application of federal statutes to state and local
political processes.
73
" Presumption that states can tax activities within their borders, in-
cluding Indian tribal activities,7 4 but also presumption that states
cannot tax on Indian lands.
75
* Presumption against congressional derogation from state's land
claims based upon its entry into Union on an "equal footing" with
all other states.
76
" Presumption against federal habeas review of state criminal convic-
tions supported by independent state ground.
77
" Presumption of finality of state convictions for purposes of habeas
review.
78
66 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 14 S. Ct. 1673, I675 (1994); Finley v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545, 552-54 (1989).
67 See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 802 (1992).
68 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (i99o); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494
U.S. 820, 823 (i99o).
69 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (I994); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 'oo-oi
(1989).
70 See BFP v. Resolution "Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1764 (I994).
71 See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 635-36 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
72 See Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 81o (1989).
73 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (x991) (Sher-
man Act); McCormick v. United States, 5oo U.S. 257, 269 n.6 (x988) (Hobbs Act); McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1987) (mail fraud statute). But see Evans v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 1881, i89i (1992) (applying the Hobbs Act).
74 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S, 163, 174 (1989).
75 See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Indians, 113 S. Ct. 1985 (993); County of
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 688, 693-94
(1992).
76 See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 196 (1987).
77 See Wright v. West, r12 S. Ct. 2482, 2488-89 (1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 5oI U.S. 722,
729 (1991).
78 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720-22 (1993).
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* Principle that federal equitable remedies must consider interests of
state and local authorities. 79
" Presumption that Congress borrows state statutes of limitations for
federal statutory schemes, unless otherwise provided. 80
3. Due Process
" Rule of lenity: rule against applying punitive sanctions if there is
ambiguity as to underlying criminal liability
8 l or criminal penalty.8 2
Rule of lenity applies to civil sanction that is punitive83 or when
underlying liability is criminal.
8 4
" Rule against criminal penalties imposed without showing of specific
intent.8 5
" Rule against interpreting statutes to be retroactive,8 6 even if statute
is curative or restorative.
87
" Rule against interpreting statutes to deny a right to jury trial.
88
" Presumption in favor of judicial review,8 9 especially for constitu-
tional questions, 90 but not for agency decisions not to prosecute.91
" Presumption against pre-enforcement challenges to imple-
mentation.
92
" Presumption against exhaustion of remedies requirement for lawsuit
to enforce constitutional rights.93
" Presumption that judgments will not be binding upon persons not
party to adjudication. 94
" Presumption against national service of process unless authorized by
Congress.9"
79 See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (iggo).
80 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355-56 (199i).
81 See United States v. Granderson, 114 S. CL 1259, 1263 (1994); United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988).
82 See United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. CL 1329, 1337 (1992). But see Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463-64 (iggi) (arguing that the rule of lenity is not applicable when sentence
is clearly stated).
83 See NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 805 ('994).
84 See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 252, 158 (1990).
85 See Staples v. United States, 124 S. CL 1793, 1797 (i994).
86 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 2483, 1502 (1994); Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
87 See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. CL I5Io, 2518 (1994).
88 See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 863 (1989).
89 See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1991).
90 See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
91 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 123 S. Ct. 2024, 2027 (2993).
92 See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. CL 771, 777 (2994).
93 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct io8i, 2087 (2992).
94 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989).
95 See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, I07-o8 (2987).
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" Presumption against foreclosure of private enforcement of important
federal rights.
9 6




" In pai materia: similar statutes should be interpreted similarly,98
unless legislative history or purpose suggests material differences. 9
* Presumption against repeals by implication.100
" Purpose rule: interpret ambiguous statutes so as best to carry out
their statutory purposes.' 0 '
" Narrow interpretation of statutory exemptions.
10 2
" Presumption against creating exemptions in a statute that has
none. 103
" Allow de minimis exceptions to statutory rules, so long as they do
not undermine statutory policy.
10 4
" Presumption that federal private right of action (express or implied)
carries with it all traditional remedies. 10 5
" Presumption that court will not supply a sanction for failure to fol-
low a timing provision when the statute has no sanction.'
0 6
" Rule against state taxation of Indian tribes and reservation
activities.' 0
7
" Presumption against national "diminishment" of Indian lands.' 0
" Narrow interpretation of exemptions from federal taxation.'0 9
96 This presumption is very probably not a viable canon today. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 52o-21 (I990)
97 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (igi).
98 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 114 S. Ct 517, 527-29
(1993); Morales v. TWA, Inc., 112 S. Ct 2031, 2039 (1992); TWA, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of
Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1989); Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,
750-52 (1988); Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 517 (1987).
99 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., i4 S. CL 1023, 1027-28 (1994).
100 See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie RtR. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 509
(1989); 'Raynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1988); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564-67 (1987).
101 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 6o-6i (199o).
102 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517, 524-25
(993) (ERISA); U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2024 (1993) (FOIA); Citicorp
Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 33-35 (1987) (FLSA).
103 See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct i588, 1593 (1994).
104 See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S. Ct 2447, 2457-58
(1992).
105 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1033 (1992).
106 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. CL 492, 5o6 4993).
107 Rule against state taxation may no longer be prevailing canon in Indian cases. See Califor-
nia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987).
108 See Hagen v. Utah, r14 S. Ct 958, 965-66 (I994).
109 See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct 1867, i877 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
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" Presumption against taxpayer claiming income tax deduction. 110
" Presumption that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 preserved prior bank-
ruptcy doctrines."'
* Federal court deference to arbitral awards, even where the Federal
Arbitration Act is not by its terms applicable.
1 2
" Strong presumption in favor of enforcing labor arbitration
agreements.113
" Rule favoring arbitration of federal statutory claims."
4
* Strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals."
5
" Rule that Court of Claims is proper forum for Tucker Act claims
against federal government."
6
* Rule that "sue and be sued" clauses waive sovereign immunity and
should be liberally construed."
7
" Presumption that statute creating agency and authorizing it to "sue
and be sued" also creates federal subject matter jurisdiction for law-
suits by and against the agency."
8
" Construe ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of aliens." 9
" Principle that veterans' benefits statutes be construed liberally for
their beneficiaries.' 20
" Liberal application of antitrust policy.
1 -
* Presumption against application of Sherman Act to activities author-
ized by states.
122
* Principle that statutes should not be interpreted to create anticompe-
titive effects.123
110 See Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. CL 1039, 1043 (1992).
111 See Dewsnup v. Timm, X12 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992).
112 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1987).
113 See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 498 U.S. x68, 173 (199o).
114 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 5oo U.S. 20, 26 (iggi); Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987).
115 See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 48o U.S. 572, 579 (1987).
116 See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. i, 11-12 (199o).
117 See FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, x0o3 (x994).
118 See American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2472 (1992).
119 Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (recognizing, but finding it unneces-
sary to rely upon, the "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deporta-
tion statutes in favor of the alien" to affirm Court of Appeals's reversal of immigration judge's
decision to deny alien's asylum request). The relatively lenient standards announced in Cardoza-
Fonseca, see id., are of possibly questionable validity today. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.
Ct. 812, 816 (1992) (interpreting statutory requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § ,xoi(a)(42) (2988), to bar an alien's claim for political asylum).
120 See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. CL 570, 573-74 & n.9 (99x).
121 See Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2578, 2586
(993).
122 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (x991).
123 See Tvo Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2762 (1992).
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" Strong presumption that federal grand juries operate within legiti-
mate spheres of their authority.
2 4
COMMON LAW-BASED CANONS
* Presumption in favor of following common law usage where Con-
gress has employed words or concepts with well settled common law
traditions.'25 Follow evolving common law unless inconsistent with
statutory purposes.
126
" Rule against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 127 except for
antitrust laws.'
28
* Super-strong rule against waivers of United States sovereign
immunity. 1
29
" Rule that debts to the United States shall bear interest.
130
" Super-strong rule against conveyance of U.S. public lands to private
parties.'
3 1
" Rule presuming against attorney fee-shifting in federal courts and
federal statutes, 132 and narrow construction of fee-shifting statutes to
exclude unmentioned costs.
133
" Presumption that jury finds facts, judge declares law.'
34
" Rule presuming that law takes effect on date of enactment.' 35
" Presumption that public (government) interest not be prejudiced by
negligence of federal officials.
136
124 See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300-01 (i99I).
125 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1348 (1992) (common law defini-
tion of employee); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., Soo U.S. go, 98-99 (iggi) (state corporation
law); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (ig8g) (common law of
agency); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1989) (domicile).
But see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 593-95 (iggo) (refusing to follow common law
meaning inconsistent with statutory purpose).
126 See Consolidated Rail v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2404 (I994).
127 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (i99I); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428, 440 (ig8g).
128 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2908-09 (1993).
129 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. ioll, 104-I5 (1992); United States
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992); Ardestani v. INS, ir2 S. Ct. 515, 520
(igi); United States v. Dam, 494 U.S. 596, 6o8 (i99o). But see Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94-96 (iggo) (demonstrating that once sovereign immunity is waived, equita-
ble doctrines can be applied).
130 See United States v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1634 (I993).
131 See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1987).
132 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 14 S. Ct. xg6o, I965 (I994).
133 See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-87 (i9i).
134 See Shannon v. United States, II4 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (I994).
135 See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (i9gi).
136 See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717-18 (iggo).
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* Presumption that federal agencies launched into commercial world
with power to "sue and be sued" are not entitled to sovereign
immunity.
37
" Presumption favoring enforcement of forum selection clauses. 138
* Presumption against criminal jurisdiction by an Indian tribe over a
nonmember.1
39
" Presumption that party cannot invoke federal jurisdiction until she
has exhausted her remedies in Indian tribal courts.140
" Presumption that federal judgment has preclusive effect in state ad-
ministrative proceedings. 14
1
" Presumption importing common law immunities into federal civil
rights statutes.
42
137 See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1988).
138 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (i99'); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (i988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693-94 (199o).
140 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 48o U.S. 9, 15-17 (1987).
141 See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (199).
142 See Burns v. Reed, 5oo U.S. 478, 484-85 (i99i); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265,
278-8o (199o); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-26 (1988).
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